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PREFACE
American modal ways and values are subjects of world
wide interest.

The cultural pattern of. the United States'

mainstream, the numerically-dominant and nationally-pervasive
middle class, is herein treated and studied as the (majority)
American ethnic.

This mainstream pattern is often used by

anthropologists, sociologists and others for their bench
mark of comparison, against which are measured other ethnic
cultures' patterns and component characteristics— the nature
of Japanese or Hopi success drives versus the American, or
old-time Italian extended familialism compared with American
nuclear family autonomy.

In probing and clarifying one

sector of the American culture's most distinctive or salient
traits and values, this paper cites evidence and interpre
tations to give insight into our widely held national image,
indicating the nature of one area of discrepancy between the
overt ideal American conception and the covert majority pattern.
Two major trait-values found to be potently linked and
powerfully decisive in the American pattern are autonomy
and achievement.

They are so strong as to be imperatives

in most people's lives.

Minority groups that do not share

these (or other first-rank, equally significant trait-values
such as the nature of family ties, or deferred gratification
pattern), to the same general extent, intensity, or mode may
thereby differ sufficiently to be classified as subcultures,
deviant or pluralistic sub-ethnics, such as the Ghetto-poor,

ii

the Japanese-Americans, and other 'ethnics' like JewishAmericans, Hutterites, and even. Mormons or communal 'Hippies.'
In this study I am indebted especially to Clyde Kluckhohn's pioneering approaches and comprehensive evaluations
of dominant American values (1958a?1^7)*

After review of

the works on American values in many disciplines, saturation
reading in American History, and then intensive study of
empirical investigations, Kluckhohn came to the carefully
considered conclusion that there is a marked and widely dominant
set of values, shared extensively, geographically and classwise, although in varying degrees, by the bulk of the United
States population.

He found that there is as much consistency

and continuity of values and patterns in the American culture
as there is in the dominant patterns of traits identified
for the mainstream of England, or Germany, or Japan, or any
other large-scale ethnic grouping.
While Kluckhohn's treatment was holistic, and he thus
identified and dealt with at least a score of American
trait-values considered preeminent, this paper must necessarily
focus on a manageable section of our cultural components.
Autonomy and achievement were therefore selected for study
as two of the most important.

However, for wider understanding

and in search of materials related to the thematic traits,
this writer has read the full coverage material by Kluckhohn
and others (listed in the G part of the Bibliography) dealing
with the major aspects or holistic treatment of the American
culture.

Hi
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Chapter 1
CRYSTALLIZING AND DEFINING THE TRAITVALUES INITIALLY— RIMROCK
This initial chapter tentatively affixes and clarifies
the two key trait-values denominated.

In it the contrasting

and varying patterns of the five subcultures found by Vogt
and Albert (1966) in their study of Rimrock-Homestead, New
Mexico, in the 1950's is used to identify and define the
autonomy and achievement complex traits.
Trait— a distinguishing feature_ or quality ; characteristicis used herein roughly synonymously with value— elements in
social life (ideals, customs, Institutions) towards which
the people of a group have an affective regard (American
College Dictionary).

Clyde Kluckhohn's definition (Vogt and

Albert 1966:6) is:
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit,
distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a
group, of the desirable which influences the selection
from available modes, means, and ends of action.
Vogt and Albert in part further define their concept of value:
Values...have persistency over time, and
manifest directionality, an observable consistency
of response to recurrent situations; and are inter
related as elements in distinctive patterns or
systems; i.e., as differentiated but interdependent
parts of the whole.
Value orientations of selected samples of social groups
can be identified and compared, as was done in this Rimrock
study, by interviews, field observations of individuals and
groups, formal questionnaires (to elicit value choices),
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Rorschach Tests, Magic Man Tests, color charts, tachistopic
images, tape recordings of small group discussions, or bystudies of oral literature— all subject to the anthropologists'
educated interpretations.

Most pioneer studies in social

anthropology, as Boas et al., used mainly or exclusively
the first two methods.
The Rimrock-Homestead study was conducted by a team of
several anthropologists working in the arid Rimrock area,
a 7000-foot plateau of western New Mexico, near the hamlet
of Homestead.

Five distinct social groupings, comprising

two main culture variations and two or three distinct sub/

cultures, of or in acculturation with the American ethnic,
co-existed and were studied side by side.

They weres 2^86

Zuni Indians (in their ancestral homeland); 625 Navajos
(in-migrants since 1868); 89 Spanish-Americans, called "Mexi
cans" (dating from 1865)5 2^1 Mormons (dating from 1882);
and 232 Panhandle Tex-Oklahomans (some dating from I865
but mostly forced migrants from the 1930's dust bowl),
hereinafter referred to as Pantexes.

For this paper the

contrasts and comparisons among all five groups are informative,
I
but in particular the divergences between those two groups
fully enculturated as inheritors and carriers of the American
ethnic culture— the Mormons and the Pantexes.

The authors

deemed the Pantexes as relatively representative in expressing
the dominant American cultural norms (though a somewhat
distinctive Southwest-cum-Ozarks version), at least in dealing
with autonomy and achievement, and the Mormons as definitely
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somewhat more deviant from mainstream values as intensified
in their locally-spatially separate subgroup residence and
association patterns (Vogt 1955*1167).

Due to the remoteness

of the area and isolation from the parent Salt Lake body,
this group was ultraconservative Mormon in its values and
therefore in its practices (Vogt & Albert 1966:46-48, 13»
214).
The study showed that each of the five groups occupied
a somewhat different ecological niche in the same area;
that their choices, or resort under pressure, depended on
their group's patterned solutions based upon values— concep
tions of the desirable— and that up to the study time each
tended to hold to its distinctive cultural patterns and
differing response to the environment.

Each group's pattern

of living and values was consciously a reflection of the
group's identity.

An example of this was illustrated in a

comparison between dwelling patterns of the Mormons and the
Pantexes.

Although both shared the bulk of their common

American values, such as the importance of rational mastery
over nature, of achievement, success, progress, optimism
(Vogt & O'Dea 1953:648), they diverged when it came to
individualness (autonomy) versus groupness in coping with
similar problems.
Illustrative of this divergence were the.contrasting
settlement and dwelling patterns.

The Mormons originally

laid out their settlement somewhat like an early New England
Puritan town, with homes grouped regularly within hailing
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proximity.

This facilitated cooperative irrigation systems

and other group endeavors.

They have continued to live thus

in newer settlements despite the shift to non-water-demanding
dry farming.

By contrast, the Pantexes settled Individualistic-

ally, each nuclear family on its own ranch and homestead,
dispersed some distance from each other with no effort to
form a settlement pattern facilitating mutual assistance
and group demands (Vogt & Albert 1966:171-2).

Thus the

Pantexes, carrying more nearly the central stream of American
culture, put a high value on being "on their own," not
closely associated with their neighbors or any community
(pressure) organization.

They prized their autonomy, whereas

group discipline of the Mormons, reinforced by religious
conviction, impelled them to partially submerge their
individual "freedom" (autonomy) for the greater good of the
group and, incidentally, greater support of the component
families.

This is not a central majority American value

practice.
Individualism Versus Autonomy
The Rimrock authors strongly stressed that "individual
ism" and adherence to "independence" are values held very
highly in the dominant American culture.

They noted, through

systematic observation of conversation and patterns of
behavior, and through value indicative tests, that the
Pantexes constituted an archetypical personification of
these traits.

Like classic frontiersmen, they could not

tolerate living "bunched up" like the Mormons (Vogt & Albert

1966;172).
Although the three terms ind1v1dualIsm, independence,
and autonomy can he used to cover the same or overlapping
areas of. values and consequent behavior, this paper will
employ the term autonomy. to denote that aspect of individualism
and independence that has as its foremost goal self-steering-freedom from being steered by any group or person, freedom
from detailed prescriptions enjoined by perceived social
institutions.

This distinction is necessary because of

widespread value illusions or confusions between the "overt"
ideal and the "covert", held for and by the American ethnic*
this is illustrated in the Pantex's overt conviction that,
by dwelling physically and organizationally isolated from his
kind, he was a "free man."

In the sense of daily decision

making, in steering his own and nuclear family life, this
would be immediately true.

But in the sense that each carried

the same cultural pattern and values that dictated this behavior
and did not countenance marked individual variations from it,
each was thereby unknowingly constrained.

Thus the Pantexes

were really not culturally free; they could not deviate
much from their cultural norms as, for example, to create
and submit to the discipline of cooperative organizations,
as did the Mormons.

Although "free" to choose among them,

he was enjoined to participate in one of the range of ten
fundamentalist-inclined Protestant churches.

A man was free

to choose his own brand, or even fragment a new one (quasi
individualism) but within the avowed Protestant limits
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(within the cultural limits of his group, in other words)
(Vogt & O ’Dea 1953:651).
Hence, autonomy is herein employed to characterize
that aspect of individuality and independence that cherishes
and emphasizes one's own career, own life deicision-making
and living, apart from others' overt suasion, and without
reference to the compulsion of an organized monitoring social
group— as the religio-social Mormon organization.

This

autonomy necessarily involves isolation from fellows; the
degree and kind denotes some of the principal characteristics
of American life.

It is latently a reference value embodied

in the old American expression, "Every man for himself, and
1
God take the hindmost."
The reader may question whether such an autonomy-oriented
group could have accomplished as much nationally and indivi
dually as the Americans have; this problem is considered in
the concluding chapter.
Of marked significance was the finding that the Bimrock
Mormons, by virtue of collective plus individual efforts,
achieved more community benefits and community activities,
i
and enjoyed a higher collective and individual economic
standard, than did the Pantexes.

The Pantex farm and business

^The cousins and offspring of these Pantexes "bunched
up" in heavily urbanized California would seem to have to
operate from a drastically different ethic, yet in each
suburban subdivision these same autonomous values, recast
in urban form, still strongly operate.
(See Chapter 3»)
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enterprises were operated according to classic individualistic
free enterprise principles with only the nuclear family
cooperating, rarely modified by a limited amount of work
exchange between kinsmen and neighbors; each nuclear family
was on its own.
With the Mormons the concept of individual private
property was strongly modified to include several extended
family enterprises and several cooperatives for irrigation,
for town water, and for cattle raising, all encouraged and
cultivated by an elaborate church-run communal system.

The

Mormons had, in their development under Joseph Smith's

i
tutelage, modified the dominant American pattern by raising
cooperative institutions to a level equal with individual
enterprise.

The church provided capital and loans to launch

communal enterprises.

Hence, among the Mormons, the American

ethnic's pervasive autonomy trait was strongly ameliorated
to the point where each family was not on its own.

In this

respect, the Mormons resembled the Zuni and Navahos (and
Japanese, and Israelis, and many other cultures) (Vogt &
Albert 1966:187-190, 58).2
2

These Pantexes derived from the Southwest Ozark variant
of the American culture and therefore in their extreme "inde
pendence" were an exaggerated version of the modal American
ethnic ("bigger than life"— in other words, beyond the norm).
In contrast, the Mormons probably derived from the mainstream
majority Northern culture, hence a comparison between
Mormons and the mainstream north and west culture would not
be so sharp. Nonetheless there would be (and is) clear enough
distinction, as witnessed in Northern California by the
author— despite the fact that most of the Northern California
mainstreamers and Mormons alike stem from the Middle West.
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The negative results of the Pantexes' autonomous
orientation versus the constructive results of the Mormons'
collective orientation were perhaps magnified in Rimrock to
an unusual degree.

The contrasts were highlighted in several

similar issues with which each group had to deal.

One

instance occurred in 193^ when the Pantexes had opportunity,
through the United States Government, to band together and
buy a large chunk of land suitable for settlement by their
youth.

They failed to organize.

The result was that the

excess population had to drain itself off to the Rio Grande
Valley and further west to California.

When confronted with

a similar situation in 19^5 to find a place for thirty-two
returning war veterans, the Mormons successfully negotiated
a large church loan and bought thirty-eight sections to
operate as a cooperative in terms of land ownership, but with
individual ownership of cattle.

In so doing they mated cooper--

ative and individual values, thus paralleling to some degree
the system of the Navajo.
Another value-charged situation occurred in 1950 when
a construction company offered to gravel the Rimrock streets
for $ 8 0 0 .00.

The Mormons contracted mutually for this

improvement for Rimrock.

But the Pantexes in nearby Homestead

were unable to agree on the operation; the upshot was that
only the individual store owners paid for graveling in front
of their own places.

Another contrast was the response to a

State offer to contribute toward the building of a high school
gym if the citizens would provide the labor.

In Rimrock,
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under the leadership of the principal, a Mormon leader,
arrangements were made whereby each able-bodied man either
worked or contributed $50*00*

Although some crayfished, the

group pressure ultimately told, and the building was completed
in 1953*

In Homestead, however, the Pantexes complained of

overwhelming burdens in their individual families and ranches;
they worked only as long as State wages were offered, but
would contribute no free labor.

The gym was only partly

built; the adobe bricks disintegrated in the rain.
For community dances the Mormons organized a budget of
$15*00 per year per family.

The dances were well-attended

and served as a significant social outlet fostering intra
group cohesion.

With the Pantexes in Homestead, dances

were "ad hoc," there was no organization to sponsor,
attendance was fitful, and festering tensions between families,
incidental to heavy drinking, often erupted into fist-fights
3
(Vogt & O'Dea 1953J6^ 8 -6 5 1 ).
Socialization - Autonomous Independence Versus
Subordinated Interdependence
Vogt and Albert found (1966:91-102) that the sociali
zation process established these differential values in

3

•'These comparisons seem perhaps unrepresentative,
putting the carriers of the dominant American culture in
a position of invidious performance inferiority to the
well-organized Mormons— in this thinly populated backwater
setting. In other settings the differential gap closes to
a degree, usually by the tax compulsions of myriad local
governments enjoining communal measures and so counter-acting
autonomy in serving community needs.
(See in this regard
Chapter ^).
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children very early.

A comparison of chi Id-raising, practices

among the Pantexes, Mormons and Zunis makes this clear.
In their push for independence, the Pantexes ended
breast feeding earliest of the three groups, at a median
age of nine months (the range for the Pantexes was six to
thirteen months, which is close to mainstream American
practice and hence evidence of the normativeness of the
Pantexes).

The Mormons ended breastfeeding at a middling

median of twelve months (range, eight to seventeen) and the
Zunis the latest (median., twenty-four months, range twelve to
sixty).

Toilet training followed similar curves:

the Pantexes
/

were the earliest, starting at a median nine months and ending
at thirteen and one-half months; the Mormons starting at a
median twelve months, ending at twenty-one months; Zunis
again the longest, starting at a median eighteen months
and ending at two and one-half years.

The Zunis heavily

stressed respect and discipline; the Mormons put a fairly
strong stress on respect and discipline, and demanded especi
ally getting along with the group.

Fighting among children

was highly discouraged by Zunis and actively discouraged
I

by Mormons.

In contrast, the Pantexes thought fighting not

necessarily a bad, and possibly a good, thing; it was good
training.

Above all, in the Pantex value system, each

child must be trained to (individually) pull his weight in
the world.

"Sassing’’ parents was not condemned by the

Pantexes, but was abhorred by the Mormons and heavily
suppressed by the Zunis, with the aid of witches.
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The autonomous cultural drive of the Pantexes tended
to stress competition, and begat factionalism and feuding;
inter-family cooperation was exceptional.

In religion,

for instance, they fractionated into the followings

Baptist,

Presbyterian, Methodist, Nazarene, Campbellite, Holiness,
Seventh Day Adventist, Present Day Disciples, and even
Catholic (though these members were considered "lost,"
conversion having stemmed from marriage to a "Mexican"),
The Mormons, secure at the top of the Rimrock area
cultural-status system, considered the Pantexes rough,
Immoral, and disorganized.

However, the Mormons acknowledged

the Pantexes' more open friendliness.

They admired and

pitied especially the Pantex courage in pitting themselves
one by one (autonomously) against the harsh, arid, Southwest
climate and adverse farming conditions.

Prom a Mormon

view, they pitied the Pantexes in their coping with such
adversity without real divine sustenance, fraternal communion,
or effective earthly organization (Vogt & O ’Dea 1953*651-2).
Achievement - Individual Versus Collective
The mainstream American culture's overlapping association
and close identification of independence with success is
perhaps unconsciously illustrated by the authors (Vogt &
Albert 1966;119) in their statements
That the Texans are extreme with respect to
childrearing practices that promote a strong
drive for success is indicated by the age at
which they wean their children, assuming this is
the first step in training for independence.
(Italics supplied)
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As analytic observers of the Pantex culture and as members
themselves of the dominant American ethnic, the writers
took it for granted that independence and success are to
be equated or at least are inescapably linked.

Numerous

other cultures do not assume this equation, notably the
Japanese, where success perforce must normatively be in the
context of group accomplishments (Goodman 1957» Caudill &
de Vos 1956)•

As noted above, the typical Pantex mother

viewed 1ndependence in the context of her child being a
self-starter, being directed toward and equipped for achieving
and doing things on his own.

Most American readers will

recognize this orientation as so normal, so pervasive, as
hardly worth mentioning.

Here is found reaffirmation

that this cultural norm, this close identity of autonomy
and achievement, is a pervasive value tandem operating as a
basic component unit of those elements which are distinctive
to the American ethnic's value system.

This close identity

provides a cogent argument for studying these trait-values
as a joint pair in this paper; to study one without the other
would be to miss a key relationship.
The Magic Man Test is used to measure the force and
direction of the achievement drive in children.

In it the

children are asked to make choices as to what they would
like to be.

It has been used cross-culturally by different

anthropologists, and it has been found to jrield results
that correlate positively with the results of the Thematic
Apperception Tests (TAT) following McClelland (see 1961)
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and Whiting and Child (1953)•

The test is a measure of a

'Culture’s values, indicating those goals and statuses
towards which the society, the adults, have socialized their
chiIdren.
In comparative Magic Man scoring, Pantex children came
out with an orientation toward achievement score of 57$,
Mormon 38$, and Zuni 20$.

To the query "What kind of person

would you like to be?" the Mormon children tended to respond
with ".../be/ good, honest, kind...or fish, run, go swimming,"
whereas the Pantexes aspired to ".../be/ a great doctor in
the Mayo Clinic...to be a rancher and raise beef cattle so
I can get some money...a great Yankee baseball player,"
In greatest contrast, the Zuni typically responded "...to be
a man (or woman)," i,.£., to be a Zuni.

It is notable that a

high proportion of the Pantex childrens' aspiration dreams
were to excel, to be a success, an individual success, in
far off places divorced from the fostering community,'. By the
same token, Pantex children were most eager to grow up (so
they could achieve these higher statuses), whereas Zuni
children were quite satisfied as they were (Vogt & Albert

1966i107-8 ).
The testers then offered the children, under the heading
"What is the nicest thing that could happen to you?" the
choices of Goods, or Stnbus (rich, famous, powerful), or
or Security (not being sick, or punished, or separated
from the family.)

Whereas Zuni children were most tempted

by Goods— candy, clothes or money— the Mormon girls preferred

14
Fun or Security, and the Mormon boys Status gain, but Pantexes,
especially the boys, clearly preferred Status gain (Vogt &
Albert 19661 IO9 -II).
The authors concluded that for Pantexes, early weaning,
early and strong pressure for self-reliance and individual
achievement, were the child-rearing determinatives of the
ongoing value system, and that success Individually attained
in some high status position was the ultimate goal.

Their

study noted that perhaps one-third of the Mormons were
indistinguishable from Pantexes in patterns of early weaning,
and stress on independence,

They predicted that in another

generation the Mormon patterns would be indistinguishable
from the general American pattern, as represented by the
4
Pantexes
(Vogt & Albert 1966:122),
Summary
This chapter has introduced the thesis that autonomy
and achievement are linked twin trait values of fundamental
significance in the Imperative patterns of the American
4

This observation and prediction is included herein to
afford faithful reporting— that Mormons and Pantexes did
overlap to varying extents, depending on the values in
question. However, the prediction was probably rash. From
the author's local (San Francisco Bay area and immediate
hinterland) observation there i_s convergence, but there is
still significant distinctive Mormon-type variation in value
patterns.
Recent studies indicate that Catholics in the United
States now hold the same value patterns as the mainstream,
which is historically WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant).
Thus the Mormons have managed to maintain distinctive
values whereas the Catholics have not. It may be significant
that the Mormons are growing in numbers whereas the Catholics
are diminishing.
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(United States) dominant mainstream culture.

The distinction

has been made between the autonomy characteristic and other
aspects of individualism and independence.

It was stressed

that American culture distinctively inculcates and operates
on the expectation that each person is quite separate from
others.

Each is emancipated from binding lineal or collateral

groups that would directly inhibit the most free exercise
of individual, egocentric, will— as would obligatory ties and
duties to kinfolk, cooperative enterprises, and churches
with strong social demands.

It was noted that achievement

in the American culture is highly correlated with autonomy.

I

Each person is expected to achieve high or higher status,
Independently.

He does not advance as a symbiotic participant

in a kin or other reference group or cohesive ethnic phhlanx
aiming to reflect pride on, and mutually advance, the family
or group, as with Levantine Armenians or Japanese.

Rather,

the normative American scrambles through life mostly as a
lone achiever, divorced from permanent group allegiances
or identities except for the minimum of his fleeting nuclear
family.

('
The micro-society sample findings of the Rimrock study

indicated and illustrated these points, with the settlers
from the Oklahoma-Texas Panhandle identified as archetypically
representative of the dominant American values.

The more

group-oriented and constrained Mormons were found to be
in partial contrast as to life styles, but in marked contrast
in the trait-values in question.

For, though the Mormon
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culture and Pantex culture generally carried the same American
values on the whole, the Mormons deviated significantly
in consciously and successfully raising collective values
and constraints and resultant behaviors to a level approaching
equal status with individual achievement.
highlighted the subject values.

Thus the contrast

The Zuni's values served as

an opposite pole of contrast, being highly anti-autonomy,
and pervasively group-obligations-oriented.
The Rimrock study was based not only on interviews,
participant observation, and questionnaires, but also on
Rorschach and Magic Man testing.
In the subsequent chapter possible historical roots of
this autonomy-achievement trait complex will be offered. •
Then an array of more detailed and wider-ranging international
cross-cultural studies, containing comparisons with data,
will be analyzed.

Pinally, recent manifestations of these

trait-values and their configuration in contemporary urbanized
American society will be delved into and assessed.

Chapter 2
HISTORICAL CLUES AND POSSIBLE ANTECEDENTS:
AUTONOMY AND ACHIEVEMENT
Purpose
This Chapter seeks possible and likely antecedents
marking the origins and development of Autonomy and Achieve
ment in the American culture.

The findings and interpreta

tions of modern scholars as Seymour Lipset, Jules Henry,
Cora Dubois and Bernard Bailyn— respectively a Sociologist,
two Anthropologists, and a Social Historian— are presented.
These and other contemporary specialists studied early
historical records, and firsthand (1750-18^0) observer
accounts such as those of Alexis De Tocqueville, Harriet
Martineau and others.

They weighed and compared the findings-

of these early observers, seeking regularities in behavior
that persisted through generations.

At length, after

rigorous examination and evaluation, they came to similar
conclusions.

They found distinctive American trait-values

that operated pervasively, regularly and consistently!as
manifest in the ways and aspirations of several successive
generations.

They found a cultural pattern.

Nuclear Con,jugal Units - Self Petermination
The authors of the Rimrock .study attached considerable
significance to the normative American rural dwelling pattern
17
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as typified by the Pantexes’ mode of homesteading and main
tenance of separate dwellings, through many generations.
Each lived on his own farm, an average of one mile from
each other.

A study of American history indicates that,

apart from the early Puritan settlements and the protective
stockade of certain other early settlers, individual voluntary
isolation was the typical American pattern.

In Rimrock the

Pantexes thought that such isolation produced independent,
resourceful, autonomous people, since the family, and
especially the children, lived their daily lives somewhat
sequestered from, and independent of, one another.

This was

in complete contrast to the nearby Mexican or Spanish
village, Atrisco, where homes were grouped closely into a
village pattern, and the workers made daily work trips
into the surrounding fields (Vogt & Albert 1 9 6 6 :166), following
the millenial patterns of Spain and Italy, and southern
Europe in general.
Conrad Arensberg (1955:11^3-61) dubbed this pattern
of individual dispersed farms and farmsteads Einzelhof.
He stated that the pattern antedated the birth of American
culture.

It had been established historically all along

the Atlantic "seawall" from Berber Africa north through
Atlantic Spain and the Celtic lands (but not England?) to
northwest Europe.

Thus, he believed, the pattern was brought

to America by Dutch, Rhinelanders and Scots-Irish.

It was

later confirmed by such acts as the post-Revolutionary War
western land grants to ex-soldiers, and by the Homestead
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Acts- of the 1860s, which further facilitated the trend toward
continuing dispersal.

He noted that pioneers went west as lone

individuals or as minimal nuclear families, loosely associated
in groups without ordered clustering or fixed membership.
The interpretation is thus that the major non-English
Immigrant cultures brougnt to America this pattern of dispersed
settlement coupled with its associated livelihood values,
and that the unique opportunities of a rich and wide-open
frontier afforded optimum opportunity to this trend toward
individualized sequestered farmsteads.

Prom this evidence

it would appear that the village-bound English traits could,
/

in a few generations, :■shift to the Einzelhof pattern.

Such

a pattern would be likely to favor individualistic traits over
patterns and institutions of collective mutual help and
constraint.

Factors such as virtually free land, great

geographic mobility, and the economic ease of setting up
independent households seem to have favored rapid growth of,
and shift toward, this mode of living and its attendant
values (Vogt & Albert 1966:11^4— 116, citing Bailyn 1960 j23).
Vogt and Albert attributed part of this atomistic or
individualization development to the abrupt break-up of the
Elizabethan extended family, incidental to relocation in
the New World, but it is more likely that such extended
kinship ties had been weakened or terminated long before

The Donner-Reed overland party, whose membership
almost entirely succumbed to starvation in the California
Sierras in 18^6, illustrated this loose transitory affiliation
pattern.
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the American settlement.

This breakup of ties plus the

peculiarly American factors cited might help explain why
the settlement of the South African frontier by the Dutch
Boers and the Siberian frontier by the Russians did not
produce the same individualistic patterns of nuclear family
dwelling and livelihood, nor any approximate degree of
autonomous individualistic values (Hofstadter & Lipset
1968:9-13» I65~l67).

It could be that the relative safety

and possibility of individual emigration from England and
Northwest Europe to America fostered an unbounded individual
ness in the migration.

Also, the "escape" to the New World

may have selectively attracted a significant proportion of
anti-authority, anti-compulsion types of personalities that
deviated somewhat from their normative home-cultures in
being anti-authority, anti-constraint in orientation.

England

in Elizabethan and later times had a significant share of
anti-authority, rebellious, and major and minor criminal
types of people.
It seems logical to say that, whereas a large extended
family dwelling unit perforce needed to suppress intra-group
aggression, as with the Zunis and pre-Elizabethan English,
a family reduced to the United States dominant nuclear
conjugal, unit had fewer such pressures and could give vent
to or even encourage aggressiveness, individual-oriented
effort, and, ultimately, individual careers.

The historic

18th century pattern was for each excess child in growing
up to forsake his parental home and settled neighborhood for
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the'frontier to make his own way.

Such pattern would also

foster the bent of "This new man, this American" to oppose
overt authority constraint and collective institutions, since
this new American modal personality was at least shaped by such
institutional pressures--in comparison to most societies.
Independent Self-Starting; Bent Nurtured
Studies of Elizabethan English precepts to parents
disclosed that these ancestral patterns stressed obedience
and the dampening of aggressiveness.

Following this value

pattern English colonies in the l600's and 1700's in
Massachusetts passed numerous laws designed to reinfdrce
family, and especially patriarchal family, authority.

Schools

were set up in considerable part to attempt reinforcement
2
of these old values.
Although the town fathers struggled
for community retention of their European-based value ideals
of deference to father and obedience to authority and community
constraint values, these values and thei.. practices were,
in the l600's and 1700's, eroded rapidly.

Young parents

moved away from the traditional influences of grandparents

I'

and away from the mores reinforcement of surrounding close-in
public opinion (Bailyn 1960:25-26).
First the confines of the 1000-year-old village in England
were escaped; then the 50-year-old township in Massachusetts

2

Note that from the beginning American schools were
conceived not just for skills teaching but for socialization
along the lines and values targeted by the representative
school boards.
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was forsaken.

New settlements were made and new authority

established, but there was a slippage, an erosion of
authority all along the way.

In typical continuation of

these American patterns that had evolved, the 1950*s
Pantexes stressed individual initiative and independence as
much higher values than obedience (Chapter 1).

In contrast,

the Mormons, in accord with their preceptor Joseph Smith,
consciously sought to return to the early New England
and English Puritan family values.

The Mormons deviated

from the American mainstream in several ways, some dating
to their beginnings in the 1830's and lSkO's.

Not the

least divergence was apparent in their adherence to close
community ties, family and group discipline, subordination
3
of the individual to the group.
Murray G. Murphey (1965:1^-163) reviewed accounts
of America written about 1800.

He found that foreign

observers noted extreme permissiveness of parents, absence
of deference to authority, lack of parental authority,
but -at the same time they also observed ability of the

^"Go West "t This contrast was graphically illustrated
in the 1846-^9 Western prairie and mountain crossing
where the disciplined, prudent, group-oriented Mormons
lost not a single man nor suffered much hardship on their
trek to Utah, whereas the individualistic trekkers to
California and Oregon suffered and died extensively.
However, under institutional discipline select volunteers
of this self-reliant dominant culture were able to defeat
the individualistic, rather disorganized and fractioned
Mexican armies--perhaps showing a latent American capacity
to selectively accept, and be subordinate to, constraint
institutions of government, at least sporadically (Potter
1962). However, the later brigades of the 1856 Mormon "hand
cart11 migration lost trekkers due to a late August start and
poor provision.
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children to take care of themselves, precocity and early
maturity.

Harriet Martineau (English writer, 1802-1876)

likewise observed that American children were left to a
considerable extent to their own development, that their
early training was to maximize activity and independenfce
(Lipset 1963:120 citing Martineau 1837:14-15)•

Upset

also noted that Max Berger, quoting Marryat (1943) and Dixon
Wecter (1937)» had found corroborative evidence in the
evaluations of several other European observers that American
children were seen to be undisciplined, aggressive, indepen
dently capable, self-willed, and spoiled.

Arthur M.

Schlesinger, Sr., affirmed roughly the same views, citing
J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, 1783, and James Bryce,
1888 (1943:225-244).

De Tocqueville (French nobleman

writer, 1805-1859) found mistrust of authority even in
schools where the children made up their own rules in games
(Lipset 1963:122).
Observations of Autonomous Independence
Jules Henry cited that portion of Alexis De Tocqueville's 1831 evaluation of American society wherein the
latter admired the courage of each man, each conjugal family,
fighting life alone, but mourned that nobody was compelled
to help his neighbor nor could expect much help.

Equality

of opportunity was thought to offer a fair chance to all.
De Tocqueville felt that such value practices produced
much self-reliance.

Henry adduced that the origins of

this individual drive for achievement, for acquiring mastery
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over-the environment and over one's own life, came from the
circumstances of the suppressed peoples of (Northwest)
Europe being suddenly released^ (1936:5-6).

With l40

years of hindsight, historians feel that De Tocqueville's
observations and analysis of American character are a startlingly accurate appraisal of the on-going American character.
Moreover, recent studies of American value patterns tend to
show a great deal of continuity in values from De Tocqueville's time to the near present.

Lipset holds that the

basic core values of the American character are unchanging,
that the character may take new forms, but the basic value
imperatives tend to continue through generations (1 9 6 3 :1 1 0 ).
Factors such as the salient aspect of the autonomous
personality noted— the extreme self-reliance imperative and
the unwillingness to submit to institutions of community
obligation as policing, the lack of help from others— paints
a picture somewhat at odds with the conventional, nostalgic
American folk image of cooperative group barn raisings,
exchange of farm work and equipment. * Though there is
evidence of some practice of and value in informal mutual
help and ad hoc neighborliness, there is also evidence

4

In H enry1s view this independent drive to mastery
and urge for individual self-advancement became so plausible
and possible with the richness of the continent to exploit,
that it inculcated a permanent, greedy acquisitiveness,
a vice— consumerism--that lies at the root of many of our
ills. The notion is not central to this thesis, though
it may or may not have merit.
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presented below of counter traits.

Marion Pearsall stated

that the typical American frontier model developed all along
the Appalachian Mountain edge.

Then it flowed westward

from the Middle Atlantic Fringe through the Southern Appa
lachians into the Ohio Valley, northwestward into the
Middle West, and southwestward between 1820-1860 into the
Ozarkian regions of Missouri and Arkansas and East Oklahoma
and Texas.

In so doing it carried along the ancestral

culture of the Pantexes.

In the more open country locations,

wider communication and later urbanization influences modified
the ancestral patterns somewhat toward more constraint
and volunteer fire department type of cooperation.

But,

Pearsall stated, in the Appalachian coves the folk retained
the old unchanged patterns of culture, unrefined, for a
longer period of time.
From his studies of sources contemporary with 18201860, Pearsall found that his adjudged archetypical segment
of the American culture, the trans-Appalachian society in
its "purest" state, was composed of autonomous neighborhoods,
consisting of small, shifting,'diffuse, atomistic groups.
These were subject to frequent disintegration as communities,
especially as the soil was exhausted and folk moved on.
He found that each frontiersman was supposed to take care
of himself and expected others to do the same; that relations
between households were frequently hostile.

The cooperation

that did occur tended to follow kinship lines.

Families

would sometimes band together to set up schools and churches,
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but tended to break apart easily (,19 6 6 s128-1^1) $
pendent" was the ideal value, the Leitmotiv.^

"Inde-

Pastors and

schoolmasters historically lived very insecure.existencesas did their independent employers.
Converse Aspects of In d e ^endence:
Cultural and "Peer xressure

Isolation,

Although these aforesaid American trait values of
autonomous achievement helped to produce some of the most
capable-seeming, enterprising, energetic and achieving
people on earth, paradoxically these traits produced also
serious weaknesses.

Though the resultant or associated

American political culture became outstanding in the world
for wealth, accomplishments, individual freedoms, and
swiftly evolved national image of idealistic humanity
coupled with pragmatic opportunism, still these penetrating
observers of the national character noted an unexpected
set of inhibitions and impediments.

They found associated

factors engendering a debilitating insecurity that in some
personalities amounted to a crushing burden.

^This is reminiscent of a 1971 fission of a Livermore
(northern California) Baptist church, where a fraction disliking
the Pastor's views (and behavior) split off and set up an
"independent" church. This fractionization of congregationrun churches has been typical of American social patterns.
It continues to go on here in this ultimate mani-festation
of American culture, California— especially from the more
frontier-traditioned or southern value-carrying churches.

6

The term "independent" has great value significance
in the American culture and is frequently employed in situa
tions like the above to signify breaking off and opposition
to something rejected.

2?
According to Bailyn those cultural forces which
Continually pressed the normative American toward individual
autonomy and achievement tended to heighten the individual's
sense of separateness, causing him to look upon society
from without, as a non-member, rather than from within.
The community and its embodiment, the State, seemed external,
artificial.

The institutions of government and religion

did not belong to or embrace the individual.
was isolated and alone (i9 6 0 :25-26).
any setback— "bad; luck,"

7

Therefore he

Thus if he suffered

accident, disease, or failure to

achieve--the American was quite alone.

He had few family

or group ties to sustain him (Henry 196656 citing De
Tocqueville).

Despite this feeling of exclusion (or perhaps because
of it), despite this stress on "independence," the American
pattern produced a paradoxical strong need to conform to
the values of the group.

These normative group values were

not devolved from those of the respected elites, as in
De Tocqueville's France or in most prior societies, but
arose from the mass, the awesome tyranny of beer-group
pressure.

Martineau claimed in 1837 that Americans were very

7

In Himrock "bad luck", adverse nature, was advanced
by the Pantexes.as understandable reason for failure, whereas
any acknowledgement of human failing, or lack of either
competence or "gumption", would, have been an intolerable
burden to the self-image shaped from childhood and through
many generations toward success (Vogt & Albert 1966:124).

/

/

/

/
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fearful of the opinions of others, especially of being
considered singular (unusual, nonconformist, "oddball" in
the current lexicon).

She held that they "wore chains of

repression" imposed by intolerant collective standards of
behavior.

A German traveler, Francis J. Grund, stated in

the 1830's that Americans operated in the fear and appre
hension that their actions, opinions, and beliefs might be
condemned by their fellows.

James Bryce (British writer,

1838-1922) likewise encountered in America a strong tendency
to accept and fall in line with the dominant opinion— much
more so than in Britain (Lipset 1936:108— Martineau /l833s
14-15. 177* Mesick /1922:3017, Grund /1959:52, 157. l62j,
Bryce / 19 12 :351-2.7).
Clyde Kluckhohn also agreed with'De Tocqueville's
estimate, citing his conclusion that even though in America
"the will of a'man was not shattered," nevertheless his
fate was shaped and guided.
conformity.

The popular will forced

"Mavericks" were free to think differently

and. still retain life and property, but they henceforth
became strangers to their own people, subject to social'
scorn and ostracization.

Kluckhohn accepted this judgment

to a degree, but not fully.

He affirmed the anti-higher

"establishment" value but also the parochial subordination
of Americans to standards that were strongly defined and
enjoined by public approval; that
while Americans do not easily accept authority from
above, they have ever been highly vulnerable to the
impersonal and unorganized authority of their
social environment (1958a:186).
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Thus the need for social approval, based on approval of one's
peers, even in semi-isolated settings, appears to have been
a factor negating and corrosive of the mythological, complete,
!

"mountain man" independence.

Even in the carving out of

autonomous careers there had to be validation from the
approval of others— the society.

Hence the basic form of

independence always bore its flawed contrary side producing
a vulnerability to public opinion that eroded and countered
deeper self-direction and weakened self-respect.
Wider Historical Hindsights
In comparing American culture with that culture most
closely related, the English Canadian, Lipset (1964s173192) found significant differences, rooted originally in
the American "independent" (anti-authority) values growing
out of the aforementioned early (pre-1800) transoceanic
and value-shaping frontier influences.

Unlike the Canadian,

these values were reinforced by the successful anti-government,
anti-authority ideology of the American Revolution.

These

established cultural patterns were then further reinforced
i'
in the 19 th and 20th centuries by the American romanticization
of the aggressively independent, capable frontiersman, followed
by the gun-wielding lone cowboy, imposing his own concept
of law.

In contrast, the later-settled, more evolutionary

Canadian society was more willing to accept official author
ity, .characterized by the institution-backed, communityapproved, romantic but institutional authority figure, the
Canadian Mount!e.
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Clyde Kluckhohn's extensive survey of the whole body
of literature on American values, consisting of scores of
observations and evaluations by many different authors,
disclosed to his satisfaction that "in broad outline there
is remarkable agreement upon their stability through more
than one hundred and fifty years" (1958a;1^9)-

Carefully

he questioned whether the early observers might have been
contaminated in their objectivity by one another, and
particularly whether they had all derived from De Tocqueville.
He concluded that most had not heard of one another, and
some had never even encountered De Tocqueville's writings;
yet they arrived at generally approximate or overlapping
conclusions.
While this paper can handle only one segment of the
significant American values— autonomy and achievement—
a brief review of the compass of significant values found by
Kluckhohn and affirmed by other scholars will give the
reader a clearer idea of the relationship of autonomy and
achievement to the whole.

The valuesomost commonly listed

as especially characteristic of the American set were;
individualism, pragmatism (especially mechanical ingenuity),
hard continuous work, optimism, change-as-desirable, gener
osity (compassion), idealism, deference to women, wasteful •
living, pursuit of pleasure, social and geographic mobility
(change-is-good syndrome?).

Squally important were:

the

acquisitive spirit, grasp on possessions-property, perfectability (limitless improvement, hope and expectation),
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high moralism, a paradoxical mixture of lawlessness (anti
authority) with ostensible reppect for law and order
(Kluckhohn 1958a:150).
Summary
This chapter has sought historical clues and scholarly
assessments as to the derivation of the Pantex culture
and in particular of the traits of Autonomy and Achievement.
The assumption was that the main thread of American culture
had stemmed from England, since 60% of the 17?6 colonial
population were English, and since British institutions and
values dominated every one of the thirteen original states.
Historical authorities such as Bailyn were therefore examined
to recognize the American transformation.

These sources

showed how the thematic trait-values developed apace with
the transformation of the semi-group-constrained English
villagers of 1600 into the 1750 Appalachian-breaching,
independently operating individuals and nuclear family units,
who were each carving a westward destiny.

The possibility

was suggested that the mother country's patterns were already
well along the road to individualistic capitalism and
autonomous careers torn loose from, family ties.

Also,

the possibility was indicated that selective emigration
plus the New World's individualistic economic opportunities
and lack of group controls greatly accelerated these inci
pient trends.
In order to test these ideas, a comparison was made
between the Pantexes' values and patterns of behavior and
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those patterns observed in America during the 19th century
by foreign travelers.

The findings of these observers

such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Harriet Martineau, after
"jelling" for $0 to 100 years, were critically sifted by
modern scholars such as Seymour Lipset and Clyde Kluckhohn,
whose analyses were used in this chapter.

The values and

behavior patterns found in Rimrock were already largely
recognizable 150 years earlier, in the eastern United States,
though some of them in Rimrock were found to be exaggerated
or in inbred-backwater form.

Corroborative characteristics

confirmed in both places included early weaning, encouragement
of independent child development, precocity, comparative
"disrespect" for elders and authority, weak family ties,
great store on self-reliance.
These observers also uncovered an authority factor
that American society itself did not fully appreciate:

the

pervasive "tyranny of the major!ty"--the internal need and
social necessity for conforming in values and behavior to
the’will of the society expressed by public approval/
disapproval under the dire penalty of social ostracization.
It would appear that despite the Americans' vaunted and
cherished independence in decision-making and career orien
tation, few persons could withstand that pressure.

This

is a pan-anthropological phenomenon; that is, powerful
group pressure for conformity is intrinsic to most, if not
all, societies.

It is worthy of note here because observers

found that American society believed its members to be
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freer of constraint than those of any other society.
This chapter restressed a subordinate point of Chapter
1, that the autonomy of the individual bordered in many
cases on isolation of the individual, alienation from
institutions and fellowship, and put on him the unrelieved
burden of coping alone.
For breadth, the Americans were contrasted with Englishspeaking Canada to show how the varying historical experience
of Revolution and unpollced frontiers greatly fostered
the development of the autonomous values of the Americans,
but lack of revolution and the more controlled development
kept, or turned, the Canadians toward more respect for
constituted authority patterns.

For further breadth, an

excerpt of Clyde Kluckhohn's extensive survey of the American
culture's value history was set forth (1) to reinforce the
above findings, and (2) to let the reader see some of the
scope of the wide and distinctive set of characteristic
American values that are recognized, of which autonomy and
achievement are basic determinative elements.
At the conclusion of this historical chapter it is
possible to project these trait trends into the national
future.

How well do these traits/values serve, these

cultural determinants of individual success or debilitating
insecurity, when added up into a national society of aggre
gate achievement or composite vulnerability?

How well do

they equip the United States, with its version of competition
versus cooperation, to compete with the collaterally rein
forced, highly cooperative Japanese society, and with the

fully collateralized, totalitarian Asian Communist societies?

Chapter 3
VALUES VALIDATED— THE INVERSE RECIPROCALS
Overview and Cross-Cultural
Purpose and Methods.

This chapter provides a variety

of supporting material amplifying the thematic Rimrock findings
as to the extent, nature, and significance of autonomy and
achievement trait-values.

In it the historical findings and

judgements of Chapter 2 are checked against 20th century
findings for long-run validity using the interpretations of
numerous contemporary anthropologists and sociologists.

Herein

are presented the findings of Walter Goldschmidt, Margaret
Mead, David McClelland, Yehudi Cohen, George de Vos, Francis
L. K. Hsu, Margaret Clark, and others in their subject areas.
Some findings, like those of Goldschmidt, Florence Kluck
hohn, and Mead, are based mainly on the trained anthropolo
gists’ participant observations, in effect the fruition of
many earlier supporting studies.

Other interpretations like

those of Alex Inkeles, are based on an intensive clinical
psychological cross-cultural study program employing long
written questionnaires, detailed life history interviews,
a battery of tests:

Rorschach, TAT, sentence completion,

projective question, and problems-situations (e.g., Russians
versus Americans).
The concomitant purpose of this chapter is to denominate,
sharpen and affirm those corollary trait-values that, in this
35
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American pattern, seem to be the flawed side— a negative
reciprocal product of the much admired autonomy (independence)
and achievement.

These consist of the interlocked inverse

traits of conformity (need and practice), isolation, frustra
tion, weakened self-esteem, and need for approval and recog
nition— found especially by contrast with societies that put
less value on autonomous achievement.

In Chapter 2 some of

these reciprocals were stressed historically— as in Bailyn
and De Tocqueville.

Each inverse reciprocal trait-value

herein has been adduced by more than one expert, hence is
set forth here as a likely hypothesis.

Other more controversial,

anti-social, personality-corrosive findings, as Jules Henry's
on excessive greed and Kluckhohn's (19^ 1 ) on weaknesses in
internalized social control,^ are reserved for Chapter ^ .
Mobility and Impermanence were always core character
istics of the Americans, according to Walter Goldschmidt
(1955*1209-1217).

He held that American culture was built

on mobility— historical, geographical, and social.

The

normative individual had the urge and, more often than in
most societies, the possibility of moving out from an oppres
sive or "intollerable" situation (1955:1213).

(What is deemed

intolerable might be a function of the values— such as builtin resignation as opposed to a socially approved value of
non-acceptance of "fate", the expectation that anyone with

1

These early Kluckhohn writings were more harshly critical,
more in the vein of a "sick society", than those of his mature
years. He wrote first at the end of the Great Depression, in
the late 1930 s— a time of doubting, as were the 1960's and early
1970's.
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"gumption" should be capable of breaking out of Unpalatable
situations.

)

The effect of this mobility was to undermine

group identity, sense of community, allegiance to the home
town.

In the United States a hometown was the place to come

fr o m ; in traditional China the place to r eturn to (Thomas
Wolfe, You Canj t Go_ Home A g a i n ).

So individual mobility

tends to undermine group ties and belonging.

It fosters

autonomy.

Achieved Status-Ultimate Worth were, according to Gold
schmidt (1955:1215), determined In American society's standards
largely by the individual himself, with the possible exception
/
of those starting their careers, their "race of life" at the
very top--possibly a Nelson Rockefeller or a Jack Kennedy?—
and those at the very bottom— types like Arthur Bremer (Wallace
assassin).

Consequently, if a man by middle age had not

achieved much status, he obviously had not much worth, since
achievement equals both social and self worth ("He never
amounted to anything.")

By middle age and retirement this

apparent or relative failure begot grave psychic disorder
aad depression (see later discussion of the relative position
of the aged in American society, in this chapter).

This

Unlike more static cultures, Americans have rated
resignation low on the value scale; it is deemed by the
majority as suitable only for the aged and infirm and the
sequestered religious (but very hard even for this last
group to accept).
.Spurning one's apparent lot and reshaping o n e ’s destiny,
creating one's own lifepath, has been a keystone of the
American experience.
One shall win mastery over nature and
adversity.
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system, where the individual's evaluation of his own selfworth Is based on his personal relative achievements, produces
much achievement but also much personal and family tension
and anxiety, and ultimate disappointment.
Margaret Mead in 19^1 (Kluckhohn et ajL. 1 9 6 7 :663 -6 7 0 )
set forth two significant peculiarities of American character
structure s
(1) its emphasis on moral choice, and
(2) its dependence upon achievement measured against
the achievement of near equals (1 9 6 7 :6 6 5 ).
She held that achievement was measured comparatively,
not against the father, because his achievement would be
already outmoded, but against the achievements of one's
siblings and peer group.

She held that peer group standards

were the meaningful ones by which Americans measured themselves
and their "progress".

All were expected to progress.

Her

explanation was that change was so rapid in the United States
that parental standards, and those of prior generations, were
inadequate.

Here we have a rephrasal of De Tocqueville's

"tyranny of the majority", and an affirmation of his obser
vation that the peer group sets the standards; by implication
said group is the reference point from which to win approval
and regard.

Mead's stress that this occurred because of the

rapidity of change is somewhat circular.

Perhaps, as suggested

in Chapter 2, in the two factors--the historic rejection of
authority plus the concomitant optimistic belief in change
for change's sake, change as progress— are found key elements
in the unremitting thrust to aspire higher to win regard, if
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not renown.
♦

Thus in the dominant pattern a lifespan is looked

upon as a long competitive race with one's peers.

The race is

rendered more uncertain by the constant necessity for side
long checks with the field to see in which direction the
race is currently veering— in technology, in shifts of popular
approval— for fear that, as front runner, one will be marooned
in a suddenly obsolete direction or position.
Mead also stated, as a second reason, that this peer-set
standard arises due to the diversity of American national
backgrounds (“The old man is stupid, he doesn't even speak
good English or know his way around.")

However, the historic

evidence presented in Chapter 2, and that of the Angloantecedented Pantexes in Chapter 1 tends to discount this
aspect; even with the same English (or fully WASP-assimilated)'
background these patterns of autonomous achievement and peer
reference were well established in the American ethnic during
3
the colonial period.
In considering comparative legal systems Yehudi Cohen
(1966:239-2^1) stated that:
...a central theme in interpersonal relationships
is the individual's need in the United States fo,r
independence and autonomy, a fear of too close
association with other individuals and groups.

Lately in television programs and popular magazines
Margaret Mead has carried her youth-patronizing theme to the
extreme--tbat (American) culture is continually obsolete,
the young must make up culture (the values) as they go.
She appears to be unduly minimizing the psychic and value
continuities in even American culture, and the potential
psychic crack-ups, social disorganization and anomie if
discontinuities multiply and feverish rejection of social
values becomes widespread.
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Where an individual assumes responsibility for other
members he throws his emotional lot in with the rest
of the group.
Where he does not assume such responsi
bilities, he plays a lone emotional game (1966:241).
Cohen stated that unlike the situation in traditional or
collective-oriented socieities, an American man and wife are
not responsible for each other's criminal actions, siblings
have no legal liability or responsibility for each other's

actions at any time in their lives.

Children are not responsible

for Itheir parents (except for some "antiquated" laws, no longer
effectively enforced, that insist that destitute, aged parents
are supposed to be partially supported.

This constitutes

a lingering pro-forma survival, a relic of an obsolete social
obligation).
Cohen's "lone emotional game" is echoed or pre-figured
in Jules Henry's specific restatement of De Tocqueville:
that Americans feared holding unpopular opinions, had little
involvement with persons outside their immediate family,
had sustaining relations only with a narrow coterie of
friends.

De Tocqueville said that, in extremis, the American

had the feeling that one stands alone, no one really cared
4
whether one lived or died (Henry 1966:105-106).
Russian comparison:

Alex Inkeles, et ajL., (Kluckhohn

& Murray 1964:577-592 ) employed elaborate diagnostic test
methods--questionnaires, life history interviews, Rorschach*

4
An American reader might react that, isn't this the
human condition?--which reaction only tends to affirm that
there i_s a dominant American pattern of values.
For other
culture's in the world do not so feel, at least feel it less
strongly.

TAT, sentence completion test, and problems situation tests—
to ascertain values of a group of Russians who incidental to
World War II had fled west.

His study group compared these

tests results with those of a representative and matched
group of Americans.

They found that Americans had a much

greater need for achievement, that.thfey had a much greater
need for approval and recognition, but paradoxically they
feared involvement ("don’t get involved").

The Russians

felt the need to belong to groups and have close interpersonal
contacts with people.

In contrast, the Americans feared too

close or intimate relationships as potentially freedom-inhi
biting, a burden of obligation, a personality threat.
Russians welcomed such contacts.

The

Yet Americans needed

to be liked as "all right guys" and they greatly feared
isolation from the group.
Paradox;

Modal folk in both cultures had need for

sustaining contact with their fellow man beyond the nuclear
family.

Whereas the Russian culture recognized this need

and people had institutionalized and participated in group
contacts to fill it, the American culture's dominant value
of independence overtly scorned the need for such contacts,
sub- or semi-consciously, however, the American need was
apparently powerful and expressed itself in the need for
approval by peers, and fear of rejection.^

^"A Nation of Joiners" is often a characterization
of the Americans, but in this writer's view this is greatly
exaggerated or is pro-forma.
The average man is no_t active
in a volunteer organization /Footnote cont'd on following page./
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Couched another way:

In the American culture there

existed (and probably continues to exist) a dependent corollary
to auto-achievement, namely an unseen, generally unnoted but
blindly felt, almost lemming-like compulsion toward surrogate
collaterality — a substitute social group meeting a possibly
innate need for group ties--and toward value conformity.
This compulsion exists despite the overt condemnation of
more openly practiced patterns of conformity when Americans
adjudge other cultures— as can be seen in statements like,
"Japanese businesses or government can't reach a decision
until all hands have hashed it over forever and a consensus
is reached," or "When you meet a Filipino he seems to have
cousins upon cousins to the 'nth degree, each of which has
some claim on him," or "Those Japanese tourists in Hawaii
all go about in disciplined groups, each pointing his camera
on the suggestion of the leader."

Here seems to be an

ambivalence or discordance to be examined in the exploration
a rd:evaluation ‘section, Chapter 4.

It would appear that few

Americans are strong enough-to stand on their own autonomy.
Eccentricity, or going against the group values and expec
tations, is hazardous to the psyche and to the career.
German comparison:

This unique American culture emerged

300 years ago from predominant English patterns which in
turn stemmed 1^4-00 years ago from the value systems of Anglo-

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ and club. True,
that minority of our society who are members of the Elks,
Rotary, Masons, Legion, Barbershop Quartets, do get some
group rapport, but not to any significantly sustaining degree.
Only the minorities of highly member-involved religious groups—
Mormons, Hutterites, Black Moslems— approach this sustaining
degree, and thereby approach deviant sub-cultural status.
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Saxon, Germanic tribesmen of A. D. 400.

The reader, therefore,

would expect the American and English, and to a slightly
greater degree, the German, to have a closer congruence of
values than the American and Russian, or American and
Japanese.

McClelland (1964:65-74, and 1961:197-198) cited

a study by McClelland, Sturr, Knapp and Wendt (1958)»
where investigators matched two sets of high school boys
aged 16-19 (both pre-selected elites— private school in the
United States and Gymnasium in Germany) using open ended
fantasy tests such as "What are the three things you would
most like to teach your children?"
a direct answer questionnaire.

This was supplemented by

They found that the Americans

had a much greater need for, or interest in, achievement, in
the ratio of 4.7 to 2.7. said drive was ego-centered, anti
group.

However, McClelland thought this feature, which he

deemed "selfish, self-seeking," was ameliorated and counter
acted by a correspondingly high degree of group-centered
activities like team sports and clubs, school publications
and religious associations, drama, and service organizations.
In this comparison the ratio was 5 times as much American
adolescent participation as German, whose extra-curricular
activities tended to be reported as more individual— pursuits
such as hiking or reading.

The American data indicated

that the Imperative was to develop oneself unilaterally—
to achieve— was rendered more social, was checked and
channeled by the necessity of conforming to the opinions of
other participants.

In McClelland’s (too neat) aphorism:

...So while the German engages in more individual
istic activities he has a greater sense of his
obligations to others, whereas the American has
a greater sense of obligation to himself, which
is held in check by participation in many group
activities (1961:198).

The paradox here is that the American in his ethos, selfimage, puts a premium on exercising his free choice while
the German, in making choices, admittedly tends to defer to
authority— elders, experts.

Ironically, the American

•'freely chooses" what others expect him to choose, he
accedes to majority standards although by a round-about,
somewhat self-deluding route.

So, while an American will

tend to resist overt pressure to do thus and so, the cumu
lative or subtle group pressure tends to make him conform
"voluntarily."

To do otherwise would be to risk being

"oddballed", excluded, not well-liked.
accede to majority standards.

Most Americans

They feel they should bring

up their children pretty much as the neighbors do.

British

and Austrians differed markedly on this, stating more
willingness to maintain child-raising standards of some
difference from those of their neighbors.

Americans were

even more influenced by the opinions of others than Germans
as to which movie to see, or which book to read (McClelland
1961:19?)*

As noted above, with Mead (Kluckhohn et_ al.196?

663-6?0) and in Chapter 2, whereas the German's standard
tends to be set by respected authorities, the American's
tends to be set by the amorphous "others"— neighbors,
acquaintances, fellow workers, the "peers"— De Tocqueville*
majority.
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From personal observation as a teacher, this writer
doubts that the listed group activities are typical of
American teen-agers, though the leaders, a small minority,
do participate to considerable degree, as in Scouts, teams,
bands.

6

Likewise this writer questions that this type of

participation has the great ameliorating effect attributed
to it by McClelland.

Rather, it is the other half of his

explanation, the sheer pressures of numbers, of peers,
applied to folk personalities (the normative American)
vulnerable for approval, that pressures the conformity.

In

some situations this may indeed serve non-egocentric social
ends as, for example, when the Scouts cooperatively clean up
a littered river bed, or when individual Chamber of Commerce
members depart from their competition long enough to provide
the community with a dog pound, a beauty contest, or a
polio fund-raising drive.

Rut these activities are ancillary

to each person's egocentric drive, his imperative need to
carve out his own individual mark, attain a bettered status.
Japanese Comparisons:

Mary Ellen Goodman's study

(1957:979-999) measured the values involved in occupational

The Junior College is admittedly (and hopefully)
somewhat different from high school, since 60% are earning
all or part of their keep, yet of the remaining 40/ (and
even the busy 60 /) scant few participate in group activities,
other than occasional church activities. McClelland's sample
of American high school students was.possibly skewed (elite
group) and/or they were answering the questionnaire according
to what was expected. Our culture also carries a socially
cultivated piety of supporting the ideal of superimposing
cooperative efforts, values, on top of the deep ego-centric
drives. Smart respondents may be apt to give lip-service,
for the institutionally urged goal of cooperation.

A6
aspirations of 1250 Japanese children in central Honshu.
These were compared with 3750 American children in the
Northeastern United States.

She analyzed their essays on

"What I want to be when I grow up."
cant.

Contrasts were signifi

In the upper grades the gap between Japanese and

Americans steadily widened in that the Japanese children
expressed more concern for others, the Americans progressively
less concern (Goodman 1957;988)*

In selection of future

occupation the Americans chose for themselves (self-determina
tion), whereas the Japanese choices were family-directed
or oriented.

The Japanese responses were strong for duty,

obligation; the Americans stressed that aspect very little.
With maturity the Japanese tended to subordinate personal
desires, the Americans tended to focus on them all the
more.

Japanese aspirations were expressed within the frame

work of being good team workers.

The American expression

was typified by the desire to be outstanding, to be a
star in baseball big leagues, to be somebody like a President,
to have grandiose schemes of running things.
These aspirations of urban northeast United States
children were relatively parallel to those that the Bimrock
authors found in the same (1950's) period for the rural,
isolated Pantex children in New Mexico (Chapter 1).

This

indicated a fairly broad and congruent distribution of
values even before the subsequent trend toward homogenization
from television; so confirming a dominant trait-value.
Indi.vidua 1l_sm, "self-orientation, " was found to be much
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higher for Americans than Japanese.

American children

were markedly more self-centered and egocentric than the
Japanese (Goodman 1957:998).

According to Goodman the

modal American was enculturated to think of himself as
a "private person" (autonomous), wherein private personal
gain and advancement, ii lividual rights and freedom of
self-expression and self-fulfillment were to be sought and
exercised uninhibited by the demands or needs of others,
whereas the Japanese was oriented to not think of self as
autonomous.

Japanese culture stressed uppermost duties

and obligations rather than individual rights.

With the

onset of adulthood the Japanese individual's attention
tended to be turned away from self toward family, community,
and wider society. (Goodman 1957:997-998).
Between 19^7 and 1950 William Caudill and George de
Vos (1956:1102-1126) studied 3^2 Japanese-American families,
a sample of the 20,000 individuals who chose, under duress,
to relocate themselves in Chicago during World War II.
One-third of the sample were Issei , first generation immi
grants, and two-thirds were Nisei , second-generation American
born.

They found that even in the highly acculturated Nisei

certain differentials in cultural patterns still held, as
reflected in their relatively greater success with employers
and high regard by neighbors when compared to white Americans
in general, and Negroes in particular.

TAT and Rorschach

tests were administered mainly for purposes unrelated to
this paper, but the Japanese drive for achievement emerged
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outstandingly, even stronger than that of the normative
American.
What was especially significant was that the context
of achievement differed.

Like Americans, the Japanese

placed high value on deferred long range goals, including
higher .education and professional success, hut to a high
degree (by American standards) they held that a spotless
reputation earned on the way was equally important.

Likewise

the way that money and power was used was important! its
most desirable use was for the wider family and community.
Powerful group social sanctions would be risked if the
achievements were not so used.

In contrast to Americans,

where the method of attainment and ultimate use of money
and prestige was considered a private, individual matter
(as long as you did not get caught at something illegal),
the Japanese value stressed the family and community responsi
bility (see collaterality— group bonds— below).

With the

Japanese as with, to some extent, the Simrock Mormons
(Chapter 1), the individual felt that he did not stand alone
for support and therefore conversely he did not stand alone
and free in making his choices of career and methods of
achievement.

It was always felt that the community was

hovering close about, those "white-eyes" watching, weighing,
criticizing, exerting a powerful force for constraint and
inhibition.

Hence the Japanese culture was more effective

in enjoining group or community responsibility and duty,
and thereby restricting individual freedom.

William Caudill and Henry Scarr (1962:53-91) inter
viewed and tested Japanese children, comparing them with
American children.

They classified them under the headings

of three types of orientation in values:

Individual— ego

centric, Collateral— strong orientation toward family and
wider groups of orientation, and Lineal— orienting backward
through perceived ancestors and forward through the children,
a sense of family (or class or caste) continuity.

In ranking

the social relationships of Family and of Work Relations,
they found that Americans put the greatest value on. Individual
as #1, Collateral as #2, and Lineal as #3.

The Japanese

put Collateral as #1, Lineal as #2, and Individual as 0 .
The point was stressed that these were dominant values
of each society.

Some deviates in each culture had a different

sense of priorities, as when some modern adult Japanese
set Individual as their #1 (thereby paying the psychic
penalty of considerable internal guilt or anxiety for
violating the norms in which they were socialized).

Some

minority-traditioned Americans such as the genteel Cavaliers
of "old Virginny" would put Lineal as #1, as for them
lineage, ancestral and extended "family", with its concomi
tant values and high status furnished a bulwark to their
most important set of values, a sense of elite pride.
American society has usually scorned such attitudes, as to
the majority they have appeared to reflect a distorted sense
7
of values.

7

This is demonstrated over and over among students
observed by the author /Footnote cont'd on following page./
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Caudill and Scarr (1962:90) made the further point
that a shift in environmental conditions could favor those
individuals holding minority values, elevating them to
leadership and holding up their values for emulation.
This appears to be a possibility for Americans if the
Ecology-minded "No Growl n" group should gradually win public
approval and ascendency.

But for such a group to become

constituted as the new "tyranny of the majority"--the
prevailing norm— changes in deep-seated values would be
necessary (see Chapter 4).
Florence Kluckhohn (195°* 376-393) antedated and affirmed
the findings of the above American-Japanese comparison in
so far as dominant American values.

She held that American

core culture is in orientation individualistic, achieving.
Status is determined by individual accomplishments and
productivity (1950:382-83) and is future time oriented.
She stated that American society is not lineal, does not
relate life toward ancestors.

However in some subcultures,

as for example in the Old South, or in a growth-bypassed
town such as Warner's Jonesville (19^9) or Yankee City

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ over a 15 -year
period whenever, in effect, lineality is brought up--pride
of ancestry and family values handed down, as characteristic
of the upper and upper-middle classes of the Old South.
With California students this invariably evokes strident
condemnation as being un-American; each generation is to be
on its oim. At least half the students never knew their
grandparents or what they did in life. The Mormons are
the Western deviate exception in cultivating a sense of
lineality.
(There is allied a strong, built-in deprecation by
the mainstream of Southern subculture.)
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^currently 1963). this normally weak subordinate value can
have somewhat greater weight.

Nor are American values

Collateral in stress, as there are little or no alliances
nor enduring bonds with kinsmen or wider family, as there
are with the Japanese (thus her findings tie in with Caudill
and Scarr above) (1 9 6 2 :53-91).

The American orientation

is individual, each person almost entirely "on his own,"
picking his way through the vicissitudes of life (as "pro
grammed" by the culture).

In analysis it appears that there

may be a latent receptivity for collaterality that is uni
versal.

It could be a latent but potent American trait

since Americans have functioned effectively in highly
qollateral situations, though at unusual times and places,
preferably under special duress, as when forced into crises
where the situation is highly structured.

An extreme case

was the desperate induced group loyalty of the 1951 Marine
Corps in North Korea, surrounded at the Choson Reservoir
but passionately carrying their wounded back, fighting mile
by mile.

Another example was the one-season, continent-

crossing Charlestoxm, Virginia Company, a volunteer'militarytype overlander troop trekking to California in 1.8^9 (Potter
1962).8

^Typically, ex-Marines express ambivalence: great
resentment at their egos having been crushed and free will
restricted, with an equally great admiration for the esprit
and a nostalgia about their lost sense of belonging. In
combat, most would do more for each other than they ever
would in subsequent individualistic life for any person,
including nuclear.family loved ones.

Subordinate or minority-held values may be more central
•to a minority group; e.g., those Negroes who are slum-dwelling,
poorly socialized toward success.

McClelland held that in

the past, the dominant culture had a relatively low opinion
of civil service jobs as being too limiting of daily freedom
of action, while black people, confronted with a lack of
other jobs, accepted the "low status" of a civil service
job in order to gain security (196 ^: 7 7 ).

In evaluation:

the blacks might feel deprived that they could not exercise
their freedom to refuse such jobs.

So it might not be so

much a question of different values as the compromise of
values in order to get ahead or compete.
Another, related view is that Negro lower class sub
culture operates with a "value stretch"; that is, the
minority also holds the dominant majority values, but
stretches them to include an alternate set, and uses one
or the other as the situation warrants (Robert Bell 1969:
223-^* citing Hyman Rodman 1963:209).
English Comparison:

Devereux, et al. (1969:257-270)

compared 700 sixth graders in Surrey, England, with 900
comparable pupils in Onondaga, New York (half the American
sample came from public, half from parochial schools).

As

the English sample was all native-born, the authors culled
the New York sample likewise; to eliminate subcultural
variation, they removed Negroes also.

They administered

a 30-item questionnaire concerning parent-practices as
seen from the child's viewpoint.

There was no direct or
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participant observation such as an anthropologist would
find minimal to validate or check the questionnaire.

None

theless, the authors thought the results valid since they
converged with another study where there was direct obser
vation of parent-child relationships.

They found that

the American child was encouraged to be independent and
vocal in. his views, was more vocal, outgoing, flexible,
less respectful of authority.

In comparison, the English

pupils--in some ways cultural cousins--were more inhibited
in behavior, quieter, harder studying and more stoic.
Another study by Maurice L. Farber (in McClelland
1955s323-330), compared by questionnaire the views of 32
insurance clerks in England with those of 81 Americans,
on the ranking of desirable qualities to be cultivated in
their children.

Parber found that in Britain, repression

of aggression was important, but not in America (so validating
Rimrock, Chapter 1).

For the Britons, the concept of

getting along with others was not cited, while for the
Americans it was strongly noted (therefore differing from
Rimrock's Pantexes, and more like its Mormons).

This seemed

to relate to the American responses which stressed lovegetting and giving--possibly a modern development?
These findings tended to reinforce Inkeles' findings
(above) (Kluckhohn & Murray 1964-: 577-592.) that in comparison
with the Russians, Americans were greatly fearful of being
isolated from the group; that they had need for approval
and recognition, need to be liked.

Another finding was
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that the American responses stressed adjustment to other
children whereas the British adjustment was toward adults
(McClelland 1955•• 327).

Thus these findings supported Mead's

and McClelland's views that standards tend to be set bypeers; approval must come from peers, more so than in Germany
or England.

And, of course, much more so than Japan, where

peers and family standards tended to be one anyhow.
Adamson Hoebel and Francis Hsu are, in effect, current
pioneers among recognized contemporary major anthropologists
in insisting that the study of the American character; is a
desirable and potentially fruitful field.

In his overview

of anthropological studies of the American ethnic ("national
character"), Adamson Hoebel (1967:1-?) stated that since
Margaret Mead's (1965 /1942/) war-inspired work on the Americans,
there has been a great reluctance on the part of American
anthropologists to tackle their own American culture.
This has occurred despite the great success and criti
cally-acclaimed validity of Ruth Benedict's 1946 non-participant-observer analysis of Japanese culture, The Chrysanthemum
SliSL Ml®.

^

a complex culture of 100 million people

could be analyzed and captured in a study, by a non-participant
observer, why could not one of 1 5 0 .million (now 200 million)-—
the American?

One objection was that American culture was

held to be not as homogeneous as Japan's.

However, Clyde

Kluckhohn has been cited in Chapter 2 of this study (1958a*
149) as saying that in his judgment, based on a.lifetime of
study, the American culture is as regular and pervasive in
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its dominant value-traits as that of any other major country.
And one of the by-products of this paper in examining autonomy
and achievement and considering the evaluations of many
anthropologists and sociologists, is the evidence of regularity
of these traits and their negative corollaries.
Hoebel (1967:1-7) lauds Jules Henry and Francis L, K.
Hsu as the only two scholars to tackle the American ethnic
in this last decade.

One, Henry, offered a very subjective,

angry, reform tract; the other, Hsu, presented an objective
comparison of his traditional Chinese culture with his adopted
American culture.
/

Francis L. K. Hsu, a Chinese-American anthropologist
of Northwestern University, a specialist on national charac
ter, modal personality types, and core values, has been
drawing American-Chinese comparisons over a period of twenty
years, seeking to characterize and explain the American
character (1951a » 1951^* 1953* 1961, 1963).

He cited ego-

centricity (completely or dominantly self-oriented deter
mination) as being a core trait that generates numerous
corrosive social and personal traits (1951a •2^3-250 and 19516):
|
57-66).

Compared with traditional Chinese values, the American

norm of choosing a mate for oneself, for love (which Hsu
regarded as chance), is a manifestation of ego-centric
individualism that tends to produce incompatibility, broken
homes and unstable background for socializing the next
generation.

Traditional Chinese deference to family wishes

and social suasion, on the other hand, made marriage and its
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(constricted) sex activity socially constructive.

With

the Chinese culture's stress on loyalty to the lineage and
the larger, extended family, generational gap conflicts were
minimized and the young people grew up fitting the social
mold without the destructiveness of American (and, in his
opinion, pan-Western, Euro-American) individualism.

Hsu

advanced his view that the extremely high American crime
rate was the product of emotion— runaway self-gratification
(195dbs62-65 )? He stated further that this crime level was
the product of intense pressure for individual achievement,
which has run amuck, lacking the balancing influence of
family constraints and loyalties (1963:202).

Compare also the

Japanese (above) (Goodman 1957:998, Caudill & Scarr 1962s
53-91).
Hsu held that the dominant element in American kinship
values was "self reliance" (autonomousness).

Each person

functioned as an independent unit and was enculturated to
think foremost of his own rights, pleasures, privacy, status,
advancement, and to try to achieve these wants through self-

g
Hsu's comparisons are based, of course, on the patterns
of pre-Communist China prior to 19^8. Such society no longer
exists on the mainland. Although diluted, these values still
persist, and are still significant, in American-Chinese, where
overall, despite the publicity of San Francisco's Chinatown
gangsterism, the delinquency and crime rate is only a small
fraction of that of the American mainstream. However, various
other students of Chinese and Chinese-American culture have
noted that this system also involved much internal conflict
and stress, and occasional suicide, although the American
seems to involve much more internal and external stress,
pyramided.
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reliance.

Furthermore, an American was culturally compelled

to so strive since he had no set niche or longrun family
(no lineality sense) or larger extended family and lineage
ties of reference.
destiny.

Each person had to carve out his own

Since the parental family could afford no protection

for the child as an adult, the child sought the security of
his peer group.

The peer groups of his school, playground

and job would be his mentors, judges, and measures of success. ■
By contrast, in traditional China the children were oriented
vertically toward their elders, rather than peers (1963:202).
In evaluation:

Hsu has held very strongly to this theme

over twenty years of writing and studying the American
character.

In it he independently affirms Mead (Kluckhohn,

et al 1 9 6 7 :663 - 6 7 0 ), Inkeles (Kluckhohn & Murray 196^:557592), McClelland (196 ^: 65 -7^), and Devereux (1 9 6 9 :257 - 2 7 0 )
on peer-power and the paradox of the American concept of
free-willed independence actually circumscribed by the noninstitutional, irrational, ineluctable peer-power (democratic
power?) or "tyranny of the majority."10
Success-Failure Conformity:

Likewise, Ksu affirmed the

view that the stress on independent achievement continually
spurs the self-reliant man to outdo his peers, to seek
visible symbols of relative achievement.

An example would

be changing homes frequently In an "upgrading" progression,

10A "democratic" folk opinion, but actually suppressive
of minority or independent values.
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moving to ever better homes outward in the suburban ring,
or changing friends to match, or shifting from club to club
(as from the Elks to the Country Club, or from the smaller
college to the greater university, or from the four-square
Fundamentalists to the Episcopalians) (Hsu 1963:213).

A

deep psychic injury restxts when the striver has attained
successive higher levels but then "stagnates"--hits his
ceiling on a job plateau, or otherwise falls short of his
ultimate status.

This shortfall tends to be interpreted as

a shortcoming, a failure, even though the modal American
has, in fact, heretofore climbed a fair piece upwards in
his job status and real wages from where he started— his
father's level.

This was largely made possible by the

constant population and geographic expansion and exploitation
of new resources, catalyzed by technological and managerial
transformations.
Said status striving and resultant apprehension of
mediocrity, with increasing sense of failure, tends ultimately
to block much of the striver's avenues of satisfaction,
sociability, status, and security.

The self-reliant man
j
has no retreat— not back to where he started from, nor back
to his family of origin (it no longer exists) (Hsu 1963:
228),

Feelings of inferiority, low self-worth, and frustration

develop all along the way, from grade school to middle a g e , ^

^ I n De Tocqueville's assessment, "in a democracy"
most men will end up being frustrated since only a few can
win the choicest plums. He assumed that the American democracy
would serve as the prototype for all. In that, he may have been
the prisoner of insufficient data— of European, Western civili
zation blinders.

59
and worsen with old age (see below).

These phrases parallel

those of Goldschmidt and Clyde Kluckhohn (above, 1955sl2091217, and 1 9 6 7 :663 -6 7 0 , respectively).

Hsu holds that

the more a culture stresses self-reliance, the
more it will generate fear of inferiority...
and the more it will compel him to conformity
(1963:217)
So he comes to agreement with Ihkeles (Kluckhohn &
Murray 196^:557-592), Devereux (1969:257-270), with the
historic observations of De Tocqueville and Martineau
(Chapter 2) in the seeming non-sequitur (from Western philo
sophic rationale) that this most individualistic culture,
in self-determination, operates to prescribe restricted
patterns of performance and values on its members.

In Hsu's

Reasoning it is not so odd, this constriction or channeling
of the free will, by peer power, but is a cause and effect.
Intra-Cultural
Oldsters:

Hoebel (1967:1-7) erred in listing only

Jules Henry and Hsu as interpreters of the American culture
during the last decade.

Two contemporary northern California

anthropologists, Margaret Clark and Barbara Gallatin Ander
son, in their study of Culture and Aging (1 9 6 7 ), have probed
deeply into the post- 6 5 , or terminating, stage of the life
cycle.

Most Americans prefer to close their minds to this

aging segment of society and its characteristics,

Clark

and Anderson's method was largely that of in-depth, long
term interviewing (buttressed by questionnaires), and thorough
acquaintance with their subjects and with the milieu, in
this case representative aged from both mainstream and
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minority subcultures in San Francisco (most of the sample
were born and raised elsewhere).

These authors affirmed

the basic values of autonomy and achievement as set forth
from the many approaches mentioned above.

And they found

their aging subject sample subscribing to these values to
which they had been socialized from childhood.

They held

that an American is expected to:
,o.be independent, responsible, and self-respecting,
and thereby to be worthy of respect in one's own
right (1967:428).
As stated in connection with Hsu's views, in the
development of a typical American career, frustration and
feelings of failure may become overpowering by middle age.
Finally in old age and after forced retirement these feelings
tend to become an obsession.

The authors hold that in America

success-achievement has a "sacred character", that most of
the oldsters can no longer "produce" (that is, they are not
allowed to produce).

Retirement ends the principal prop

to their self-esteem.
self-value.

It erodes their self-image, their

They perceive themselves as finished, of little

value in terms of their social worth.

Curiously, or

logically, the peer value standard does not shift with cir
cumstances! it is still the lifetime value of producing,
of being a success.

One aspect of the achievement imperative

is the need to feel superior to other people.

It is so

enculturated that the authors claim that American mental
health demands it.

This too is a product of autonomous

achievement; one must achieve to have self-worth.

Remove
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this ego-support and the personality edifice has a tendency
to come apart and deteriorate (Clark &.;Anderson 1967:182).
The other half of these twin imperatives, culturally
induced need for independence, is equally difficult for the
aged to continue to fulfill.

All their lives they have

been taught and expected to pilot their own lives and
support themselves (see Pantexes, Chapter 1) and now.in
the socially-enforced twilight of diminished self support—
even a healthy person is often forced to yield up his job
at age 65— these socially degraded people find it harder
and harder to live up to their norm of self-respect.

As
/

their money fails, circumstances, in many cases, force them
to turn reluctantly to social agencies for help.

Most of

the "mainstream"people interviewed, those of the dominant
middle-class-values majority, abhorred this prospect, feeling
such "charity" to be a final confession of defeat.

For

their values, unchanging through life, included
...the ability to keep on managing oneself,
to go it alone, to reaffirm that one is still a
self-governing adult (Clark & Anderson 1967 080).
The authors noted that the personality effects of accumulating
years arise only partially, or not at all, from biological
factors; that the culture powerfully prefigures the effects
of aging on personality and even on health.

For the culture

decrees that the great majority of aged people can never
again achieve' in the real world, the competitive, wage-earning
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world;

12

they can no longer maintain their economic independence;

they tend to become "sick", eventually developing real
physical Illness.

So this apparent biological problem

actually stems from mainstream American cultural values,, In
comparison, the subject Latin-Americans and Chinese-Americans,
to the degree that they were not fully acculturated, tended
to keep their health and self-respect.

A Chinese or Latino

deemed it right and proper for his middle-aged children to
support him with no lessening of his self respect, whereas
the mainstream American detested this "admission of failure"
— "never be dependent on your children— or anyone else"
(Clark & Anderson 1 9 6 7 :177-180, 222, 381, 390).
As the aged were unable to measure up to these tests
of manhood, of self-worth, they would increasingly develop
mental and physical problems.

"Death is preferable to

becoming a burden" was frequently voiced.

Institutionalization

for a modal American, who has normatively been anti-insti
tutional all his life, is slow death— as the last vestiges
of one's autonomy, independence, is torn away.

In an equali-

tarian ward of a nursing home or County Hospital, it is
very difficult to feel superior to anybody.

Women lived

somewhat longer than men, since their achievement and inde
pendence drive had not been inculcated personally to the
same degree.

In evaluations

as women are now being stimulated

12
' To the "Senior Citizen", even programs of card-playing,
folk dancing, and making unsalable handicrafts seem as
fuseless" (nonproductive) as they would to Americans still
in the mainstream if this were their main activity.

63
to compete for higher achievement on a ladder equal with
men, we can expect to approach equal problems of failing
self reliance and ego-erosion thirty to fifty years from
now.

In effect, the aged now have no real place in the

American value system based on autonomous achievement.

For

their own self-image and mental health, the aged need to
reconstitute themselves as a new subculture with value
standards significantly different from those of the dominant
culture.
Another dismal product of autonomous living, with its
associated geographic and social mobility and the resultant
condition of having few friends and scant or rejected family,
was that most aged people had lost all or nearly all of their
social alliances.

The initial reason was that most, as

normative Americans, throughout life never had many endearing,
enduring relationships, family and friends.

Compounding

this was that early death, or retreat, of those relation
ships one had had, combined with the act of retirement, cut
one off from the "actives"— those still gainfully employed,
who shun and abhor the physical evidence of what lies in
wait for them, too.

Also, the authors found a tendency for

these typically defeated, inadequate-feeling aged, who loathed
the physical and social evidences of their "failure," to
avoid each other.

All told, these factors produced mental

changes that worsened any personal relationships.1-^

1-^A few escape this by being deemed not aged, by taking
high office at 65 as did President Eisenhower, or being an
independent savant like Hyman Rickover and Albert Einstein,
or a recognized independent productive artist as cellist
Pablo Casals, age 9^» conductor /footnote cont'd following page/
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The average American past 65 years of age Is deprived,
anxious, depressed, idle, and unhappy.

In part, this results

from the cultural patterns which stress autonomy and achieve
ment (and which favor youth and beauty, fragile family ties
and anti-authority), and in part from the catastrophic inter
action of the destructive effects of being deemed old— un
wanted, non-productive.

This is in contrast to an aged

Korean or aged member of other traditional East Asian cultures,
where such Individuals are accorded an honorific status.
They usually retain control of the family wealth, and continue
in respected dally social relations with others of kin and
community who are of different generations (Clark & Anderson
1967.13).

The reader may suspect that Clark and Anderson have
magnified the negative aspects of the aged's situation,
that they shared the (alleged) bias typical of psychological
anthropologists— "wherever he looks he finds pathology,"
In fairness, it should be noted that these authors did
find that a small minority of their senior subjects were
making a reasonably good adjustment to their social security

I

years.

One category consisted of those who were able to

continue along their lifetime "independent" (self-supporting)
ways, as for example the self-employed watchmaker or

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ Leopold Stowkowski,
age 8 9 , or Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, the
Pope, and most U.S. Senators. But most people cannot do
this. Even those economically well off and healthy feel
the purposelessness and alienation faced by the gabby,
vigorous, purposeless, unwanted hero of the movie Kotch.
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carpenter.

These, In effect, were able to continue comfor

tably with their value system past the age of 6 5 . A different
sort of category were those who had always been deprived of
significant achievement and/or of minimal affective ties;
the dislocations of age were minimal for the spinster or
bachelor who had long ago become resigned and adjusted to
lone living and for those persons who had also learned
throughout life to accept relatively low achievement levels
and standards of consumption.
In these latter cases the lifetime relative deprivation
of either family ties and/or notable achievement and its
economic rewards had rendered these types of people marginal
in terms of the dominant culture.

But when they passed 65

their heretofore deviate or substandard patterns suddenly
became those patterns most suitable for survival, because
such deprivation became the majority norm.

Therefore these

longtime-disadvantaged people experienced only a lesser
"come-down" of deprivation and so suffered the least injury
to their mental health.

Other minorities who also deviated

from the dominant autonomous achievement norms made excellent
adjustments— those of Oriental or Latin cultures who had
lived and continued to live in some measure avowedly reinforced and supported by family and collective ties.

lA

Cases have occurred of lonely old women of the mainstream
culture putting ads in'the paper for people to phone them.
Organizations of volunteers have tried to perform such
contacts. The Mormons have a regular function of calling
isolated souls (and also "jack", fallen-away brethren). No
Mormon is supposed to be isolated, or ever "lost" for good.
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This would tend to Indicate that two of the values that have
contributed mightily to the American reshaping of a con
tinent and leading of the world in wealth and technology,
were two of the most undesirable values to carry on into
normative (typical) retirement (no useful function or place).
These findings could even indicate that in the end true
"independence" might— though not necessarily— derive from a
lifetime of non-achievement, non-autonomousness.
Jules Henry, through his work in geriatric hospitals
(1 9 6 3 ), tended to confirm the findings of Clark and Anderson
(1967:182, 380)*

He held that humans in America tend toward

obsolescence all through life, which begets great insecurity.
(This paralleled Margaret Mead's affirmation of American
built-in human obsolescence (1 9 6 7 :663-67) though she asserted
that the remedy was to keep changing toward youth values).
Henry observed in the geriatric hospitals "the bitter fruits"
of the culture being fought out to the end, as when two old
ladies in their fight for autonomousness quarreled over the
use of the room, fighting for privacy (or dominance?) (Henry
1963:9-29, 450-1).

In evaluation:

Perhaps in another culture

where privacy (autonomousness) is not considered as high a
"good", they might still fight— if they were very poor, like
low-caste Indians who might fight with their families or
others for food, or if they were feeling a loss of position,
as in modern urban Japan, whose people struggle increasingly
for attention and a role of relevance.
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Like most Americans, who feel that man should be in
control of his destiny, Henry apparently felt that there
should be a good ending to all stories, and that human
relation problems are, or should be, solvable.
of his values makes Henry very American.

This aspect

Henry observed in

the hospital that:
...culture outlasts body and mind...body barely
alive...but the mind of an American upper-middle
class woman is concerned with appearance and
status, and her capacity to hate and hurt, as
determined by the channels of her culture (1963:^73)•
In evaluation:

This reflection in the aged of personal

conflicts aged cultural value patterns is possibly just
human, although it does illustrate the persistence of value
laden behavior to the end.
love.

Henry found, in the end, no

Is this lovelessness in old age an American trait-

value, too?
Summary
In this chapter the findings of many anthropologists
and sociologists have been marshalled as to the nature, extent,
and significance of the value-traits autonomy-achlevement
in the (dominant) American ethnic pattern.

Some, like

Inkeles, based their findings on a battery of methods—
Horschach, TAT tests, life history.

Others, such as Gold

schmidt and Mead, based their findings on a lifetime spent
as participant-observers of the American culture with compara
tive studies with other cultures— their methodology was
similar to Ruth Benedict's analysis of the Japanese culture
(19^6).
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Although Benedict used interviews and studies, she was
not a participant observer.

Significantly, the findings of

those who used ethnographic observation and those who used
the battery of tests and observations were in general agree
ment.

Agreement in findings as to the nature and extent of

the autonomousness— independent, own self-oriented, decision
making— and achievement— the awesome lemming-like drive for
autonomously attaining high job status regardless of ties
of family, friends, home base— occurred so regularly as to
be somewhat repetitious.

There was consistent explication

as to the gap between the American culture's conscious
advocacy of cooperation, veneration of the aged, strong belief
in the family ties, and the actual contravening reality of
dominant egocentricity.
For soundness of support, a dozen or more authorities
of repute in anthropology-sociology, as well as lesser known
researchers, were discussed.

There was no serious disagreement

among the experts on the essential, central trends toward
more autonomy and achievement, manifest over the 200 or more
years that the American ethnic and its cultural patterns
have been in existence.
■ There was, however, some disagreement as to the nature
of this self-reliance, and the nature of the socialization
for adulthood, as between classic Rimrock development of
youth's competency and Jules Henry's modern findings of youth
dependency.

The studies also revealed a claimed weakness

in internalized self-discipline, as seen both by Kluckhohn
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and in the Danish comparison.

These more controversial,

or unreconciled, items may in part represent shifts over
time, and shifts from the rural frontier to the urban setting;
in part they may represent intrinsic paradoxes and selfdelusional myths which the radical intellectuals rediscover
each generation and use

jo

dub America a "sick society."

The following chapter will discuss how these critics' efforts
may in time serve as catalysts for socially self-directed
changes in values, to reconcile some of these discontinuities
and apparently inappropriate sets of values.
Comparison with various other cultures— British, German,

I

Japanese, Chinese--highlighted differences in values held
by the Americans, as being more independent and seemingly
individually outspoken and "free-thinking."

However, the

purely individual striving was seen as masking the unconscious
workings of an imperative social control.

Most members of

the dominant "mainstreamers" had been socialized to strive
along socially dictated patterns of conformity.

The con

comitant ego-sapping by-products of the imperative for
autonomous achievement, in striving to "be better" (than
i

someone else), winning higher status, that De Tocqueville
noted already in the 1830's, were found also by the modern
authorities.

Whether studied in comparison with Chinese,

Russian, English, or other cultures, these negative reciprocals
stood out:

the conformity (above), isolation and loneliness,

frustration, especially in middle years and most strongly
past 65 years of age, and need for approval and recognition
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at all ages coupled with the deep-seated fear of too close
1<
involvement with others. J

^Given all these factors, most of which drive people
apart rather than together, it's a wonder that any American
marriages last a lifetime. Even though as would be expected
the American culture has the highest break-up rate of any
Western nation, it is a tribute to other values— loyalty,
traditional ideals, minority religions— that the majority of
marriages still hold (70 $ of first, 50 $ of second marriages).
As the reader knows, there is no basic hominid guarantee
of such holding, since in some cultures, notably the Hopi,
the modal situation is no marriage lasting for a lifetime.
In the Hopi society, however, the extensive collaterality
takes up much of the affective need.
The Mormons hold that the selection of a mate— for
eternity— is the most important choice in life; that no
career achievement can be valued in comparison to the loss
of family. The Mormons have doubled their American membership
these past 20 years— only half of which growth was due to
excess of births over deaths.

Chapter ^
THE MORE TENTATIVE APPRAISALS
Purpose
In Chapter 3 were set forth those basic characteristics
and interwoven products of the autonomy and achievement
trait-values that are widely affirmed and are largely agreed
upon by scholars.

At the present writing these seem to be

accepted by the serious students of American culture, and,
in this writer's view, are acceptable as relatively sound
judgments even though at some points they are at variance
with the common American self-image.

Hence, the first

three chapters of this paper brings together data and sources
usable in revisionist efforts to clarify the American view
of ourselves— self-knowledge.
In this chapter the paper seeks to go further and explore
the uncertain.

The first part presents an overlapping

collection— in effect, a web, of interpretations and inferences
about these traits, in contemporary American society.

These

trait-values' modern manifestations, and possible shifts
or transformations over time, and the resultant effects, are
set forth as worthy of note because the various writers'
interpretations of these phenomena seem to have, at least in
part, some truth to them (though they are not proven, nor are
they disproven).
These interpretations are offered for thought, as
tentative clues and Insight into the complexity of a national
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culture— particularly the paradoxes of the American culture.
These interpretations are also, of course, the product of
the diverse individuality, the selective biases, of the
different observers.
The second part of the chapter offers a final cautious
assessment of "where we seem to be" lately relative to these
traits, especially in reference to the momentous valuepractices changes that have occurred since 1965*

What now

are the salient cultural values related to autonomy and
achievement, and in what possible direction (or directions)
is the trend?
Inferences Problematic; Time Shifts in Values
Was old time "rugged individualism" sabotaged by m o d e m
urban industrial society?

Du Bois (1955s1236) and Henry

(1966:105-6) followed the logic that this prized rugged
individualism must have been eroded and weakened progres
sively since the advent of industrialization, about De
Tocqueville's time, 1831.

This gradual industrialization

of American society during the 19 th century was accompanied
by a shift in occupation from the "independent" self-employed
frontiersman and farmer to the work-dependent industrial
employee, and from isolated farmstead life to close-in
urban living.

Therefore, they held that the transformation

of the average American type into a subordinated, somewhat
regimented employee was a transformation to normative
conformist.

However, there is much evidence to indicate

that the conformist trait was endemic from the beginning,
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as touched upon in Chapter 2.
The clue perhaps lies in the natural tendency of the
observers of colonial or frontier child-raising to emphasize
the obvious, the strikingly American, traits:

Independence,

precocity, rejection of authority and the seeming sturdy
competence of the children.

Yet the observers may have missed,

or given insufficient weight to, the less patent but in effect
repressive or "neurosis"-inducing manner of child-socialization by parents and peers.
Noting examples of "survival" of earliest American ways,
researchers pointed to Rimrock's (Chapter 1) weaning and toilet
training as being forced at the earliest possible time,
far ahead of the world average (Whiting & Child 1953:7^t
and in Barnouw 1963:12^-5).

While the foreign observers

of the 1800's did not specifIcally mention this "diaper
anthropology," they did note great parental disgust at
soilage and heavy stress on cleanliness (Murphey 1965:
151).

These latter values have a familiar ring, for Americans

do have a great— "neurotic", from a world tfiew— loathing of
dirt, especially fecal dirt.

Cleanliness is such a com

pulsion in the American culture that other peoples are
often judged civilized or not by the standard of cleanliness
1

alone, and "dirty" is the most common pejorative term.

^The reader can recognize "dirty"'s extensive cultural
role: "dirty S.O.B.", "to play dirty", "dirty jokes" (sexually
prurient episodes).
In the Oakland police usage, any suspect
or wanted person is "dirty." Or the phrase that became household
from its popularization on a television program--"dirty old man"
— the pejorative of dirt, and of age (both deeply negative values
in the culture).
Or, in America "Godliness is next to cleanli
ness."

7**
Authorities state that both in Rimrock and modern urban
America oral indulgence is much more restricted than in
most other societies:

the nursing period is short, the

anal training is more severe than all other societies
studied except the Tanala and Chagga (Barnouw 1 9 6 3 *350-351»
and Whiting & Child 1953*7*0-.
Therefore possibly the Americans developed a pattern
of child raising that produced seemingly self-reliant,
self-sufficient, precociously mature children who, at the
same time, had been imprinted with an anxious, compulsive
drive for success, a concomitant fear of failure, and an
/
allied deep-seated insecurity that left them constantly
craving approval and recognition.

Both sets of traits

would tend to be interlocked in the same persons, though
perhaps in varying proportions.

Frontier farming conditions

did equip the person with practical skills to cope with his
environment and so may have immediately masked these insecuritymotivated needs, which then emerged in adulthood.

For these

widespread pressures for conformity were noted long before
the shift to urban living and wage-employment (See Chapter

I

2.)

However, the said urbanization/industrialization shift

seemed to concerned critics to be also a shift in values,
since the locale change made both the drive for success and
the autonomy-achievement related insecurities more apparent.
Factors such as the chanciness of job security and self
support, the vulnerability to the effects of "boom-and-bust"
economics, the relative individual success and failure roles,
were played out in the urbanized theater with large proximal
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audiences.

When so grouped together, people's vulnerabilities

were more apparent.
Thus it may be that the esteemed American folk trait
of "rugged individualism" would be a more apt designation
for the thematic guiding principle and value of autonomous
self-orientation, and its fulfillment in carving out an
autonomous enterprising career successfully, as, say, with
an Andrew Carnegie.

It is less valid in reality in its

representation of a theoretical, idealized concept of a man
of independent integrity, the rare non-approval-seeking
2
Independent-minded individualist, like Edmund Ross.
Our
folk lore, our national myths, put high lipservice value on
the latter qualities, but our true deeper values usually
icrked to consign such an individualist to status failure
and nonemulation by the members of his society.

There is

a tendency to judge such ambivalence of values to be the
product of modernity, but it appears to have always been
there— this massive ground-swell unconsciously socialized

p
Edmund Ross's (1826-190?) career is an embodiment of
an ideal, but not the dominant norm.
Elected as an abolition
ist type radical Republican Senator from Kansas, he refused
in 1868, on the principle of justice and for the good of
the presidency, to accede to the overwhelming public and
peer (nearly 2/3 of his fellow Senators) pressure to impeach
President Andrew Johnson. For voting his conscience and
independent judgment, he was outrageously vilified and
ostracized and denied election the rest of his life. For
20 years thereafter he worked mostly as a newspaper printer,
usually bucking the dominant norm--and usually losing.
Earl Warren's career had significant elements closer
to the norm of conformity to the popular will. Despite his
later liberalism and seeming independence as Chief Justice of
the United States (1953-1968), in 19^+2 as California Attorney
General he strongly supported the widely popular Californian
demand for relocation of the Japanese-Americans. He was
elected Governor the next year.
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in the Infant and childhood need to conform to achieve
approval and security, versus the ostensible American ideal
of (seemingly) being a truly independent man.

Some such

approval need is probably as old as man, a "social animal,"
but its power appears to be at noteworthy variance with
conventional American mythology.
Pursuing the problem a step further, have the shifts
in socialization patterns of the American child tended to
make him and his adult self more vulnerable to the power of
his peers?

Has the erstwhile training for independence—

taking care of oneself— been delayed to post-adolescence
by indulgent and protective child-raising?

Is there discon

tinuity in the raising of American children for the life
with which they must cope?— and succeed?
Lipset (Chapter 2) quoted the 19th century observers,
Martineau, Berger, Wecter (1963:168-177. 119) to the effect
that not only were the American children making their decisions
apart from their parents, but they were trained for activity
and self-dependence, they were equipped to strike out on
their own, to make their living "on their own hook."

3

Some of the observers, like Anthony Trollope in i860 and
James Muirhead in 1900, felt that the child's desires and
views were unduly indulged, that they were never punished,
that America was a child-centered culture (Lipset 1963:120),

From New England fishermen, "on your own hook" was to
fish self-employed, independent— an early ideal.
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The Rimrock authors (Chapter 1) judged that the Pantex
children were being trained for independent coping with
life.

American history witnessed repeatedly the pattern

of sons and daughters growing up, cutting the family
connection, and moving westward on their own.

The relative

success and survival of -hese offspring must have indicated
that they had good socialization to get along on their own,
for the tendency was for one to get scant help from one's
neighbors (Chapter 2).
But in modern times this "paddle-your-own-canoe" type
of independence has been called into question.

In the

Farber study (McClelland 1955023-330), the values British
parents preferred their children to learn in contrast to the
American preferences Indicated that the British (said they)
put greater stress on self-reliance, whereas the Americans
stressed instead getting along, smoothly functioning with the
group, getting and giving love.

This would be at considerable

variance with the stated and observed ovex-t values of the
Rimrock Pantexes, and would be more akin to the Mormons.
In evaluation:

such study carries the suspicion of methodoI'
logical flaw— in accepting what people say as fact, rather
than combining the questionnaire with anthropological studies

of relationships.

Yet the findings may indicate a shift

toward recognizing the power of the peers and more realis
tically discounting the shibboleth of independence.

Perhaps

independence has simply been subordinated to concern over
"getting along."
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Kandel and. Lesser's (1969:3^8-358) study used question
naires to compare the student-stated values of American
and Danish high school students (232? American vs. 1552
Danish).

There were no validating field observations.

They

found that the reported typical Danish parent-child rela
tionship was more like the impression of American families
recorded in the 19th century by De Tooqueville and others,
that the modern Danish family relations were the more demo
cratic and equalitarian.

In contrast, the American students

reported constrained, autocratic, parent-controlled rela
tionships (surprisingly!).

The authors suggested that the

American adolescents operated under external constrains
whereas the Danes had internalized norms instilled through
the greater infant discipline practiced by the Danes com
pared to the permissiveness of the American infant disci
pline.

They reported that the average American adolescent

was much more dissatisfied than his Danish counterpart with
the amount of curtailment of his independence:(he was, of
course, still dependent on the parents for economic support),
In conclusion! This is a hard study to fit in.

The

findings seem to conflict with those of most authorities,
who state that peer power was and is of paramount impor
tance in American society, especially for developing adoles
cents.

Possibly the Danish comparison could be partly right.

In America, attempted parental control during the schooling
period, extended to age 18, does play a longer role than in
Denmark and most other countries where school is on the
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average terminated two or more years earlier.

There have

been sizable changes, diminutions, in responsibility put
upon American children since the Rimrock type of life,
including the lengthening of economic dependence since most
American high school students lack significant chores or
role in the earning of the family income.

Along with higher

and higher education, interrelated with the shift to urban
living, has come prolonged economic dependence.
Another interpretation is that it could be the rivalry,
the tension, between peer power, egging the juveniles on
to "independence" and defiance of parental control, versus
the continued concern and control efforts of the parents,
that caused the respondents to pain a picture of parental
despotism.

Perhaps the respondents had no real comparison

of what really authoritarian parents would be like--see
Jules Henry below (1963s260-261).

However obliquely, these

authors may have stumbled onto something possibly valid,
though lacking supporting and clarifying evidence.

Kluck-

hohn, in his earlier, less mature criticisms of American
society (19^1:175) held that, "The United States is, then,
weak in internalized social control from the educative
process."

But he did not clarify what he meant.

More

telling evidence of such lack of internal controls might be
the performance of the American prisoners of war in Korea,
discussed later.
The Danish comparison touched only part of the depths
of the adolescent value conflicts, which Hsu cited as highly
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significant (1963s200-201).

Therein he portrayed, the

inconsistency, the discontinuity of the American
child-raising process wherein the child is encouraged to
he autonomous, independent, to think for himself and he
self-reliant, while perversely (from Hsu's view) parents
sought to shield the child from the real world of adults,
of adversity, competition, cruelty, evil, sickness and
death.

The Americans sought to impart to their children

an idealized picture of the world, man, and American society.
Hsu held that such raising was defective in that it delayed
maturity and produced great stress due to gaps in sociali
zation.

He held that this shielded child raising resulted

in lack of adequate experience training, lack of the temper
ing needed to cope with life.

He contended that it could

give rise to serious disillusionment with the real world
when the post-18-year-old person must suddenly seek success
in a highly competitive, autonomous role in a society
demanding competent, unremitting performance.
A generation ago, in 1938, Buth Benedict (in Kluckhohn
& Murray, 1967:522-531) characterized the American culture
i
as one of great discontinuity between what children were
allowed and socialized to do, and the great weight of full
competition with adults they had suddenly to cope with upon,
adulthood.

In America, the stress attending the onset of

However, other critics fault the school system for
being too competitive, producing failures at an early age;
a conflict of values. Recent Education Ph.D. products seem
to seek to minimize the competitive value as destructive.
/Footnote cont'd on following page/

adulthood is great.

The psychic ""breakage" is thus great,

developing in those who cannot adequately cope with society's
demands, or who flounder through life deemed arrested in
some pre-adult stage of "perpetual adolescence".

Most

cultures enculturate the young in a consistent, gradual
system of developing greater and greater responsibilities,
awareness and capacities to cope.
As noted, the shift from Rimrock-type living to modern
urban has accelerated these discontinuities.

However,

this factor need not be totally decisive as witnessed with
the partly-assimilated California Chinese and Japanese and
the 95 % mainstream-cultured Mormons.

All three groups are

still relatively successful in their raising of children
in such a manner as to develop patterns of responsibility;
they all experience lower rates of delinquency and family
disorganization, and achieve significantly higher scholastic
attainments.

It is noteworthy that in all these studies of American
values, those values of duties and obligations were rarely
cited (compare with the Japanese in Chapter 3-“Goodman 195?•

979-999)«

Ultimately the mainstream American culture is

highly demanding that its adult members taker on heavy duties

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ Instead, perhaps
all should graduate equally from high school, and then
college? Yet competition for entrance, and then within
the graduate and professional schools intensifies. Again
is posed the inherent difficulty of reconciling Lipset's
characterization of the basic American conflict between
"equality versus achievement."

82
and responsibilities.

To many recently-matured persons

these demands seem to "be sprung" suddenly and unmercifully
just at adulthood.

Many persons are inadequately equipped

to cope at that time, and some are never able to measure
up.

In contrast to the scant, or very mild duty and

obligations of age 16 or 1 7 , come harsh and severe demands
such as being drafted for war at age 1 8 , or being a pregnant
bride at 2 0 .
The "independence" of modern teen-agers, Jules Henry
(1 9 6 3 s260 -26 l ) claimed, had nothing to do with the old
1760 American frontier.

Rather, the self-reliance of American

teen-agers, as he studied them close-up through continued
contact and observation, was "but a hollow shell."

Henry

held that this "independence" was the product of many
weaknesses, "a mindless infantile egoism," the fruit of
parental permissiveness.^
one pleases."

It meant simply:

"doing what

He found a "war" going on between the teen

agers and their parents, the "kids" struggling to get out
from under any control.

But, he judged, the "kids" were

very unsure of themselves.

He also found a "war" going on

between the teen-agers themselves, fearful of showing too

^Where the Handel and Lesser Danish comparison found
the American parents exerted autocratic control, Jules Henry
found these same type of parents unduly permissive.
Kandel
and Lesser operated via questionnaires furnished by students,
Henry mainly by personal observation, close involvement, and
questionnaires. Possibly the same questionnaire, as admini
stered by Kandel or Lesser, if given to Henry's subjects,
might have evoked the same "authoritarian" claims.
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much interest or affection for others lest they he deemed
weak and dependent, and he belittled in the pecking order.
Here can he noted a cultural consistency, a longrun con
sistency in the American culture.

Lately, as well as back

in 1760 and in the Rimrock frontier of 1950 or the aged
frontier in San Francisco of i9 6 0 , to be dependent was and
is one of the worst value pitfalls that can happen to an
American.

Sometimes "independence" meant and means economic

self-support independence— that stern imperative that
takes over at adulthood— hut also throughout American
life and history it seems to have applied equally to emotional
independence.

Even being emotionally dependent on another,

according to Henry, involves high risk of rejection as
being unworthy, or being deemed cheap, easy, or weak
(Henry, 1963:258-260).

By the folk patterns of values,

an American was, and apparently is, supposed to walk alone
(see Cohen 1966:239-241, Chapter 3)*
Critique:

Henry is difficult to reconcile with the

rest of anthropological writings on the American culture—
other than Clark and Anderson— since his tone is that of
a revivalist reformer, righteously condemning the evils
of American society.

His work lacks perspective in that

he makes no comparisons with any other society.

Yet his

probings of the teen-agers and later the geriatric hospital
inmates furnishes useful insights, even though he scants
the strength of the culture and focuses on what he deems
its overriding pathological aspects.

One cannot be certain

8^
that this fear of emotional involvement is as singularly
American as Henry says— though Cohen remarked that "the
(American) plays a lone emotional game" (Chapter 3* and
Cohen, 1966:2^1)— or if it is Anglo-North European, or
merely human.

However, we should at least offer as a

possibility that this "lone emotional game" is an outgrowth
of the Anglo-American culture of 1?60 developing its auto
nomous orientation, its pride of economic independence,
its pride and myth of stubbornly individual discrete charac
ter strength.

The explanation is suggested that this au-

tonomous culture where the normative person was bereft of
extended emotional and fraternal bonds has been able to
survive, and in its perverse way flourish, because of the
uniquely-American, relatively-easy economic possibilities
and because of the driving cultural imperative of carving
out a job and life alone, or nearly so.

This culture is

somewhat unique in that most men in other times were heavily
dependent on and sustained by their web of bonds to each
other.
Has old-time rugged Individualism become "insatiable
greed"?

Back in ■19*H Clyde Kluckhohn (19^1:169-171) stated

that the individualism of the frontier spirit that had won
the West had, in modern urban industrial society, become
the social ill of egoistic individualism.

He held that the

venerated pioneer individual enterprise was now a cancerous
cultural "dysteleology."

Jules Henry stated that this

American drive to achieve, acquire, master--which sprang
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from the circumstances of the suppressed of Europe being
released to take advantage of the great opportunity for
self advancement in exploiting and building up a rich
continent— became at length a vice of Insatiable greed.
It was now manifest especially as consumerism, materialism,
a major sickness of the American society (Henry 1 9 6 3 :6 ).

Kindredly, he affirmed (1966:101) that historic indi
vidual achieving had been perverted to the endless consumerism
of "egoistic consumption."

In evaluation:

This decried

process was all of a piece, one continuous evolution.

The

evolution from the frontier-farming achievement drive to
get more land, buy more livestock, acquire a good looking
buggy, a coal-oil lamp and then a gasoline lamp, a waterpumping windmill, became today's drive to get more consumer
goods, private cars, color televisions, air-conditioners,
better suburban living, private swimming pools.

This is a

logical continuum of sequential growth and achievement.
It is part of our deep seated values of acquisitive "conspic
uous consumption" as the reward and hallmark of success.
The ecology-oriented minority face a monumental task if they
are to argue out, or render subordinate, this achievementconsumer satisfaction value.

6

But when this trait is carried

It is noteworthy that the large 7-store Berkeley
Co-op, founded 40 years ago primarily for consumers to
consume more thriftily and with better quality, has these
last 10 years shifted in ideology, becoming a political
crusade group to attempt to downplay the consumption value
and emphasize redistribution of wealth, ecological controls,
racial equality, agricultural workers' power. The frequent
recent conflicts within the Board of Directors reflect this
clash between the old dominant /Footnote cont'd on following page/
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to extreme its socially adv e r s e effects a r e clear.
Is the A m e r i c a n d r i v e n intol e r a b l y b y the demands of
"the system," the culture?
Henry

Related to the above consumerism,

(1963:13-30) h eld that A m e r i c a n culture was f o r c e d

on b y its
...achievement, prcfit, m o b i l i t y drives, a n d by
the d r i v e s for security and a h i gher standard of
living.
A b o v e a l l it is d r i v e n b y e x p ansiveness
(1963:13).
He m a i n t a i n e d that this a c h i e v e m e n t - s u c c e s s need had b e come
transf o r m e d into the F r a n k e n s t e i n of im p e r a t i v e c o nsumerism
and d y n a m i c obsolescence.
A m e r i c a e v e r y t h i n g — cars,
u n d e s i r a b l e quickly,

He i n d i g n a n t l y no t e d that in
homes,

p e o p l e — a g e d and b e c a m e

i n cl u d i n g the w o r k i n g person beset

by u n c e r t a i n t y and techno l o g i c a l

" d r i v e n n e s s ,"

He claimed

that a large segment of the p o p u l a t i o n work e d in f ear of their
jobs being canc e l l e d or a u t o m a t e d out fro m un d e r t hem—
r a i l w a y station masters,
(space engineers?).

shipwrights,

auto assemblers,

M o r e o v e r he m a i n t a i n e d that mos t p e o p l e —

those in the 6 l $ of the p o p u l a t i o n c omprised of factory hands,
mechanics,

laborers,

truck drivers,

clerical and sales

persons engaged in rou t i n e wor k r e q u i r i n g little educ a t i o n
or i n i t i a t i v e — fo u n d litt l e s a t i s f a c t i o n in their work.

/F o o t n o t e cont'd f r o m p r e c e d i n g page/
values of the
1 9 3 0 - 1 9 ^ 0 " s e s tablished by Fin n i s h i m m i grants with the liberal
u n i v e r s i t y - o r i e n t e d m i d d l e class of that time, now t r a n s f o rmed
into the u l t r a - l i b e r a l i z e d - r a d i c a l i z e d n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t y (but
co-op m a j o r i t y ) a d v a n c e m e n t of this n e w set of values.
The
Co-op n o w loses m o n e y for the first time, b u t the n e w m a j o r i t y
feels this is a m i n o r concern.
A trend?
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Their type of work provided little gratification! it reduced
the self to a cog.

He held that people cared little for

one another on the job since each was inherently replace
able.
H o w a r d Beck e r

(1963:215) was in g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t w i t h

H e n r y a l t h o u g h he n o t e d that the career elite seemed,
extent,

to an

to f i n d r e w a r d i n g w o r k in the A m e r i c a n system.

One-

third of the sample of s u c c essful m i d d l e - a g e d m a l e s felt
they we r e in control of their lives.
self-di r e c t e d
satisfactory,

They felt that autonomy,

skill, a n d r e s p o n s i b l e s o cial i n t e r a c t i o n were
However,

success f u l functioners,

the m a j o r i t y of the sample,

even the

felt that they wer e in effect putting

i n time, m e r e l y ear n i n g a living without m u c h p e r s o n a l choice
o r the joy of a sense of identity.

In evaluation:

It is too early to say, and not

appropriate in this paper, whether the above findings or
inferences are true— there is some indication that intellectualized researchers project their own feelings into
evaluation of how blue collar or repetitive clerical workers
feel about their jobs and lives.

Nor can it be certain,

if the findings turn out to be "true," that job dissatisfaction
is the fruition of long-term American trends— the heightened
expectation of a "better life" here and now, in a society
that has been socialized to expect too much, including job
satisfaction.

Also, some critics would contend that a

person's sense of identity should not hinge on the quality of
his job.

However, given the American identification of self

worth with job success, this equation is inescapable for
the normative individual.

And, though some thus find the

American job system wanting, the rest of the world appears
to be striving hard to approach these high material standards
of the American worker and the Interesting highly paid jobs
of its professionals— 20% of our doctors are immigrants.
However, other societies may have the advantage of cultural
compensations and psychic bulwark in affllial emotional
values, beliefs and the security of group-tied social co
hesiveness— as the Japanese, and likely both the Chinese
and North Vietnamese Communists.
Kluckhohn's Five Value Shifts - Evaluated

In noting value shifts, Kluckhohn (1958a:1^5-21?)
adjudged the cultural trends as he found and projected them
forward nearly 15 years ago.

Now in retrospect we can

judge whether he seemed to have really captured a valid
trend or denominated an abortive or elusive one, or was
just the prisoner of wish-fulfillment.

Not all of his

inferences are closely related to the themes autonomy and
achievement.

(An example is the valuation and participation

in institutlonalized religion.

Kluckhohn saw it as going

u p , and actually since 1965 it has been going down overall
in numbers and in relative llfe-cycle significance, espe
cially with the Catholic Church.

The exceptions that have

enjoyed numerical growth and unshaken conviction were the
most traditional, participatory and member-committed
Institutions with clear-cut standards, like the Mormons,
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Southern Baptists, Lutherans, Jehovah's Witnesses.)

The recent workings of the conformity trait, which
in the American culture is the reciprocal, the reverse side
of autonomy (Chapter 3)» Kluckhohn saw as emerging in a new,
somewhat compromise form, which he characterized as
"collective individualism."

He discerned that the operation

of the longstanding imperative of the conformity trait— the
need for public approval, the dire psychic necessity of being
liked and approved by one's peers— had, with the growth of
social consciousness, started to take a socially constructive
form.

The cumulative effects of the late 19th and 20th
/

centuries' historic revelations and criticisms of the harsh,
inhumane components of the American social system had begun
to bring about a shift in values.

As propounded in the

writings and revelations of Steffens, Norris, Dreiser,
Upton Sinclair (especially with the national acceptance of
Lewis' searching value criticisms contained in the nationalcharacter embodiment of Babbitt) these concerns began to
take hold of the opinion-makers conscious value system.
The dominant norm began to shift.

Kluckhohn foresaw that
I

this norm would henceforth become ever more involved in
working toward a "collective individualism" more humane ana
socially constructive.
He held that it was becoming fashionable and widespread
in professional and business circles to be supportive of
group values in community organizations, social class, pro
fession, and various agencies for community uplift and
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healing.

This was r e f l ec t e d in m o v e m e n t s a n d organi z a t i o n s

that we r e m ore

social minded, m o r e esthetic,

of m o r e c o m m u n a l controls
In evaluation!

and in support

(Kluckhohn 1 9 5 8 a ! 185-7.

20^).

One can see K l u c k h o h n ' s trends adva n c ing

a n d w i d e n i n g to capture m o r e supports as a c c e p t a n c e of laws
b a n n i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in h i r i n g and promotion,

for instance,

or executive programs f or "affirmative action" w h e r e b y the
d i s a d v a n t a g e d m i n o r i t i e s sometimes get prefe r e n c e s o v e r
equally or b e t t e r q u a l i f i e d whites,
b u s s i n g for integration,

or court orders f o r

or laws for ecological controls,

or the b a n on fil l i n g in any m o r e of San Fran c i s c o Bay.
This

social c o n s c i o u s n e s s backs laws rai s i n g the level and

a c c e s s i b i l i t y of wel f a r e

so that about 1 0 $ of the m a i n l y

u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n is on welfare,

compared to only 2 0 $ in

t he depths of the Great D e p r e s s i o n w h e n 2 5 $ of the whole
population was

jobless.

These v a l u e shifts are R e f l e c t e d

in the capture of the B e r k e l e y Co-op by the m i l i t a n t
c rusader s
judges a n d

(see f o o t n o t e #6), the g rowing r e l u c t a n c e of
juries to convict and p u n i s h a c c u s e d c riminals

a n d the atte n d a n t stress on r e f o r m rather t h a n punishment.
It would a p p e a r that the old,
A m e r i c a n s u p o n morality,

moralism,

h igh v a l u e placed by
and righteousness,

b e e n d r i f t i n g f rom the success ethic of the ruthless,
irresponsible,
responsibility.

has
s o c i ally-

self-made m a n toward an ethic of m o r e social
This is a c c o m p a n i e d b y a f e e l i n g of u n a p p roving

t olerance a c t i v a t e d b y a somewhat u n easy but vul n e r a b l e
guilt t o w a r d those who

"haven't m a d e it."

However,

the
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autonomousness of the Individual achievement is only lightly
relieved for most folk in their acquiescing to these laws
and attendant value shifts.

In total, the above does

indicate change toward group-beneficial values.

Yet so far

this trend appears to have cut very little into the essential
autonomousness of individual living.

One perhaps unsympa

thetic observer with some contact with numerous local "communes"
where groups of nonrelated people live together— usually to
seek some ties of surrogate family or fraternity— claims they
are but "shifting way stations of lonely people."

7

A second significant shift advanced by Kluckhohn was
that toward tolerance of heterogeneity (1958a:197-198) which
would, if actual, be a significant break with the conformist
patterns noted above.

He cited the fact that protesters

and deviates in American history were suppressed not by the
police or government but largely by public opinion— in extreme
cases by vigilantes.

He noted that Americans were now more

aware of other cultures, due to several circumstances of the
mid-20th century:

the presence of millions of American

servicemen abroad in World War II, the ease of foreign travel,
growth of education, wider knowledge of the world and
tolerance for differences, and the decline of authoritarian

7

Estimates for Berkeley and adjacent Oakland range
from 500 to 1000 of these group living arrangements; some
are a structured fraternity with mutual obligations and .
responsibilities, others operate with fluid arrangements
and deteriorating home environment. A local real estate
dealer put the average commune life at two years.
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child raising.

8

In evaluation:

since Kluckhohn wrote,

particularly since 19^5. this trend has mushroomed— homo
sexuals publicly sue for equal rights, athletes and working
males wear hair that is not only shaggy but of a length
and style considered in this century to be "female", the
movies show explicit sexual intercourse and various forms
of what has been deemed "depravity".

In fulfillment of

greater rights for diverse peoples, the films show blacks
in superior sympathetic roles, voting requirements eliminate
the necessity for reading English (ballots locally— San
Leander and Hayward, California— are printed also in Spanish
/

and Portuguese), abortions are furnished on demand, war
protesters are sanctioned, the voting age in 1972 was lowered
to 18.

In terms of alternatives to the family, an increasing

minority, say 5% or more, of men and women now dwelling
together are doing so in trial marriages, coeducational
dormitories, or shifting promiscuous colonies.

Also, in the

direction of wider rights, the Ralph Nader-led consumeroriented attacks on business and on the quality, safety,
and security of its products have been energetic.

I

It has, on the whole and despite occasional use of
left-wing fascism— as in "trashings", forcible breakage
and ehtry, and disruption of free speech— been a period of
feverish liberalization on many fronts.

Among the factors

Q
This continually noted "decline in authoritarian
child-raising" is a curiously-recurring anomaly. Nearly
every generation of observers since 1?00 has sagely noticed
the same decline (Chapter 2). At that rate most or all
authority should have disappeared long ago.
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helping to erode American national conceits have been the
repercussions of the "no-win" (containment) Korean and
Vietnam wars, and our failure to convert many subsidized
countries like Korea or Ghana to our democratic values
(despite, unexpected success in West Germany and Japan),
These 'failures', or qualified successes, have generated
a great deal of American self-criticism and even cultural
self-hatred, as expressed in intellectual "liberal" circles
and made public in the Saturday Review, New York Review,
and New York Times.

There has thus occurred, despite the

fact that the past war revived half of the world's economy,
an erosion of American confidence in its historic mission
of carrying the banner of righteous democracy and justice.
We seem suddenly to be mortal and flawed and uncertain of
our values.
Per h a p s K l u c k h o h n was correct in seeing that this
to leranc e of h e t e r o g e n e i t y was a l r e a d y b u i l d i n g u p in the
1950's.

It has o c c urred as a pro d u c t of the q u e s t i o n i n g

of a n d loss of f a i t h in old no r m s and values.

Also,

the

l i b e r a l i z a t i o n m o v e m e n t s are w o r l d w i d e in all of the m ore
a f f l u e n t i n d u s t r i a l nations;
f or w o m e n ' s suffrage in 1971*
A m e r i c a n thematic values?

even the Swiss m a l e s voted
What is its effect on our

This r e l u c t a n t a c c e p t a n c e of m o r e

d e v i a t i o n in life styles has b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by g r o w t h of
a small m i n o r i t y who have perhaps tempo r a r i l y r e j e c t e d the
a c h i e v e m e n t "syndrome" and live ver y modestly,
on p a r t - t i m e

jobs,

or beggarly,

we l f a r e f o o d stamps or by "rip-offs"

(light stealing from the affluent, morally unreprehensible
from this group's viewpoint).

These latter values; should

they grow in numbers and repute, could influence the builtin dedication of the American culture to autonomous achieve
ment of jobs, status, money and other symbols.

So far these

unorthodox "dropouts" are too peripheral to be significant.
Some small percent of middle class youth "drop out" of the
career work track or treadmill, but their places are speedily
taken over by achievement-oriented "mainstreamers" or
minorities, just admitted into the mainstream— as for example
Pacific Gas & Electric's Black repairmen.

The net result is

downward social mobility for a few, a little more opportunity
for upward mobility for others in a currently-tightening,
reduced-opportunity career pyramid.

The impact of the

widespread liberalization may erode other values such as
fealty, self-restraint, racial inequality, and heterosexuality,
long before those trends have much effect on this basic
American deep seated drive and need for personal achievement.
In a politico-cultural sense, the 1972 Presidential
election was partly a contest between paragons of the old
individual (autonomous) achievement values— "self-made",
one-generation-up-from-working-poverty but middle class valued
successes, as Nixon and Agnew— versus the more radical
McGovern supporters who, as zealous social minded reformers,
questioned the "materialistic" orientation of the mainstream
of American society.

These ultra liberals tended to reflect

and support and urge ever more of the above liberalization
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trends and attempted to put the onus of immorality on their
"establishment" and property-cherishing opponents.

These

ultra liberals held that the lauded differential achievement
represented by a Henry Ford, Henry Kaiser, Howard Hughes or
J. Pierpont Morgan was in great measure the product of influence,
connections, tax loopholes, and of immoral, ruthless corporate
and political wheeling and dealing.

Though a sizable portion

of the mainstream middle class, which since 1933 was nominally
Democrat but as ever was also strong in its allegiance to the
traditional acquisitive achievement valuer eventually and
reluctantly swung toward McGovern, still he lost the majority.

i

The fatal tone of his campaign was set in the primaries where
his closest supporters {k2% with Master's Degrees) weakened
their credentials for liberal tolerance of variation by
spurning the old Democratic Party politicos, the organized
labor hardhats ("Archie Bunkers"), and the lower middle class.
In so doing they seemingly also rejected the normative
American values of striving to get ahead and acquire property
and material possessions--the symbols of achievement and bul
wark for security.

Tolerance of diversity, of political

compromise, had not yet claimed 1972's most "liberal", or
intolerantly radical, major political wing.
These new movements do not really seem to have breached
the wall of autonomy of each person--the fear, or bother, or
obligation of person-to-person involvement— although some
9
have this as a major aim.
9
A not exceptional example is found in the neighbor,
the chic, well-educated, /footnote cont'd on following page/
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A

third trend seen by K l u c k h o h n was toward h e d o n i s m --*

that is, p r e s e n t time orientation,

less a c c e p t a n c e of d e l ayed

g r a t i f i c a t i o n patterns, m o r e sel f - i n d u l g e n c e

(1958a:192).

He felt that the o l d - t i m e P r o t e s t a n t Ethic value of p u t t i n g
off rew a r d s un t i l one had e a rned them thr o u g h long struggle-h ad in fac t a t t a i n e d them as hall m a r k s of a c h i e v e m e n t — had be e n
eroded by the values of "enjoying" it now," b u ying on time:
appliances,
pools.

cars,

f o r e i g n t r avel trips,

private s w i mming

This was r e m i n i s c e n t of Henry's consum e r i s m imp e r ative

(above a n d 1936:6).

Traditionally,

these comforts and

i ndulge n c e s wer e expected to be earned and enjoyed in part
as the symbols m a r k i n g achievement,

success-crowned.

But

n o w as they b e c a m e m o r e w i d e l y d i f f u s e d b e c a u s e of a d v e r 
tising,

r i s i n g expectations a n d affluence,

of people came to wan t them soon,

In evaluation:

greater circles

to enjoy them now.

this expectation of current gratifica

tion could also be a contributor to the United States'
unparalleled modern nation crime rate.

Even though the

trend was predicted correctly--there has been a pronounced
shift toward current consumption— still the evaluation should

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ autonomously striving
"Mrs. Jones," divorced, her children largely with a house
keeper, active in a range of establishment-attacking causes,
marcher in protest parades, outraged contributor to the
defense of those deemed wrongly accused by the "system."
She finally asked if her immediate neighbor to the
west, Mrs. Wilson, an aged but pleasant lady, "was away?"
The answer was that Mrs. Wilson had died 10 days ago. The
cause-oriented Mrs. Jones had never bothered to socialize
with her aged neighbor. Her compassion was for causes, not
individual people, especially not the aged who most need
personal interest and neighborly compassion. This orientation
is common among both Liberals and Conservatives.

be seen against the mainstream drive still operating to
"save some, Invest some, borrow some."

The normative aspir

ants to higher professional status still devote years to
higher education.-in hopes of attaining the admired and
rewarded job status.

Though there has been some slackening

in the demand for college the last two years, there is no
likelihood of ever returning to college enrollment levels
of even ten years ago.

Competition to enter medical and

law, nursing and other professional-vocational schools has
intensified in the 1970’s.
Like most social changes, this one is more of a modifi
cation than a reversal.

One could say that the deferred

gratification pattern has been modified, moderated, and
somewhat transfbrmed.

Consider, as an example, the old

Portuguese immigrant to Alameda County of 1900-1920, who
was already imbued with the "Protestant" ("Portegee?")
ethic, although unlike "WASPs" was supported by strong
family affinity ties.

He worked as a laborer six or seven

days a week his entire life, never took his wife out to
dinner, bought a car only with cash, and never "enjoyed
himself" with frivolous expenditure.

He finally died owning

two or three houses^or an apartment house.

His pattern has

now elided into the pattern of his largely mainstream valuepatterned son, "Franklin Delano Souza".

Printer or painter

or contractor, Souza now typically works only ^0 hours per
week including overtime.

He takes in shows, expensive Big

League Football and Baseball games, takes his wife to Tahoe
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and on trips, buys his children bikes, and owns, only his
own $27»000 suburban home.

Yet he still manages to pay

off his car and his house, and still saves some money—
relative affluence allows a compromise.

Notwithstanding,

he more than ever wants his children to achieve, to "be
somebody— not a no-good .lippie."

He has scant tolerance

for those taking welfare, and doesn't want public housing,
or the kind of people that live in public housing, in his
neighborhood or even in his largely middle class suburban
city— Ban Leandro, parts of Hayward, Castro Valley, Pleasanton,
Livermore, Dublin.
K l u c k h o h n ' s f o u r t h s i gnificant point
that the A m e r i c a n cul t u re has,

(1958a:19^) was

since 1933»

u n d e r g o n e a great

change in a c c e p t a n c e of g o v e r n m e n t and other o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
control,

and concom i t a n t l y demands,

and is h a b i t u a t e d to,

a great a m o u n t of services and g o v e rnment support.

Hence,

m a n y see this as a n i n d i c a t i o n of erosion of self-reliant
individualism.
1933-^5*

Before F r a n k l i n D. R o o s e v e l t ' s administration,

scarcely a n y o n e r e c e i v e d a g o v e rnment check.

Now

huge sectors, if not the majority, of the population receive
|'

such checks, directly or indirectly— Welfare, Social Security,
Veterans, FHA-backed loans, Model Cities, Agricultural Price
Supports, Soil Bank, grants for academic research or for
highways or local;schools, revenue sharing.
In evaluation:

although Americans have, since the

1700's, cherished a built-in antipathy toward authority
and much government, there has been a nearly complete reversal

since 1933*

Unli k e m o s t social change this one has embraced

a who l e s a l e a c c e p t a n c e of enormous g o v e r n m e n t s o c i a l i z a t i o n
programs,

w h i c h h a v e grown m u c h larger in the n a t i o n a l scheme

even since K l u c k h o h n ' s writing,
a R e p u b l i c a n President,

and a r e n o w embraced even by

Ri c h a r d Nixon.

Possibly this may

eventua l l y e rodetthe basic n o t i o n that persons should take
care of the m s e l v e s all their lives.
e rosion is very slight,

So far, however,

the

since m a n y fee l that these checks

either repr e s e n t a f o r m of d e f e r r e d earnings,
Benefits or Social Security,

or are

such as Veterans'

"guilt payments",

an

equity or sharing w i t h the less abl e or less fortunate.

Others consider that their knowledge and work preparing
acceptable applications for grants for Model Cities or
research or archeological rescue is a new but now legitimate
way to pay one's way.
welfare is escaped.

One way or another, the stigma of
"You're entitled" may insidiously

erode this value of self-support reliance, and we have swung
a considerable distance from the non-protected and non
supported situation of the Pantexes.

Yet within this reshaped

economic system of a highepercent government largess and
stipulations, the concept of autonomous achievement is still
paramount even though adapted to the large bureaucracies
of government and business and academia.
W i l l i a m H. W h y t e ' s The O r g a n i z a t i o n Man

(1956) suggested

a l o n g the p o s t u l a t e of R i e s m a n that the n o r m a t i v e A m e r i c a n
was,

in the 2 0th century,

shifting f r o m an i n n e r -directed

m a n of c o n s cience a n d integrity to a n o u t e r - d i r e c t e d o r g a n ! -
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zatlon man, constantly adjusting his behavior and values in
order to be successful} thus he had no central integrity.
However, as U p s e t and Lowenthal (1961) showed, while this
characterization fulfilled the prophecy of those believing
in the deleterious effects of the loss of old-time rugged
individualism— for instance, Frederick Jackson Turner (1958)—
it was not well founded, considering the evidence available
on American character.

As this paper has indicated, con

trary to Whyte and Riesman, the normative American was
other-directed, conformist, in values from the beginning.
It is conceded that the earlier American might have had much
greater freedom in his daily decision making or in his
mode of dress, and greater latitude for little eccentricities
of behavior, when he dwelt on a remote frontier farmstead,
compared to his modern counterpart, the office worker of
a big urban bureaucracy.

The continuing theme of this paper

is that, in either case, frontier farm or metropolitan
insurance hive, he was directed by the dominant values of
autonomy and achievement.
that changed.

Mainly, it was the externals

The way of making one's own climb shifted

from cattle raising to car peddling or memo writing or gas
station operating, but the individual drive to make more,
get more, climb upwards, is undiminished.

The number of

attempts to found new businesses has not lowered.
Kluckhohn's fifth inferred value shift— The Equalization
of the Roles of Men and Women (1958 a:199)— was quite correctly
discerned as an ever-growing trend, and has recently broken
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through strongly "on the coattails" of the ethnic/racial
minority rights tidal wave.

Suddenly, since 1965» it has

exploded into "Women's Liberation" and (anti) "Male Chau
vinism" movements.

The Equal Rights Amendment to the United

States Constitution has already passed Congress with the
two-thirds vote of each house.

The United States' Govern

ment is taking widespread action against employers, clubs,
against differential hiring and promotion, or admittance,
by sex, or race, or ethnic; encouraging reverse preferential
hiring in the near future to redress the balance.

(Some laws

also state equal rights for the aged and aging, but the
society's values and its government do not really support
these at all— "They have had their chance."

Life is still

very much regarded as a race, not a process of evolving.)
In these last two years the California State Supreme
Court has found unconstitutional laws prohibiting women from
working as bar maids or racetrack stable hands, or newsgirls,
or limiting their maximum and nighttime hours of work.

Thus

laws designed to keep women out of what were considered
degrading or dangerous or heavy work situations have been
killed.

Practices barring women from higher business or

professional or blue-collar skilled jobs are under successful
attack. • The concept of woman as "a lady" is rarely heard,
but so too is the "gentleman" concept.

To be "feminine"

and to be a "feminist" now have divergent meanings.

It is

too soon to prognosticate whether this is fad or folk trend,
whether it will level off or continue.
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Kluckhohn's views, written 15 years ago, were that
American women were already the envy of the world for their
relatively high status— higher percentage of higher paid
female wage earners than any other Western society (though
still much lower than men).

This was coupled with the deeply

engrained, pioneer, chi1!ilric, and New-England-schoolmarm
status values of the society that elevated women to a moral,
esthetic pedestal higher than men.

They were considered

the custodians of American culture and preceptors of moral
values, pushers for educational, cultural, aesthetic and
social betterment standards, the centers of family life and
the basic teachers of values, a folk virtue embodiment in
skirts to be looked up to.

Kluckhohn noted that these shifts

in values toward women's "equality" seemed to many men to be
shifts toward women's dominance.

To others today, the changes

appear degrading to women and to the society.

Kluckhohn

stated that the chance was fraught with domestic tensions
and disruptions of heretofore accepted social relationships.
Now the pedestal is shaken: virginity, modesty, and deference
are, in dominant values, down-graded somewhat.

Some local
I'
entertainments presenting bestiality feature participant.

women.

Rape a l o n g w i t h o t h e r violent crime has increased

,,

several fold.
_

10

_

Pro m A u g u s t 15 to 2k, 1972, n in e days, N e w York City
experienced 6k homicidesj non e were gangland, just a n i n c r e a s 
ing part of the current A m e r i c a n culture trend.
For all of
England (50 m i l l i o n people) the Entire 1970 homicide figure
w as 1^5; Norway, k; S a n Prancisco, 14-5•
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At the same time, women are, in small numbers, becoming
telephone linemen and truck drivers, and gardeners.

They

are also seeking, with government sponsorship,’ to become
professors, a trend pioneered especially in anthropology.
Abortions in urban states now exceed birth;

the birth rate

has dropped lower than it was in the depths of the 19 3 0 's
depression.

The divorce rate has accelerated as women

increasingly seek their individual fulfillment; more children
thereby will grow up likely to experience divorce themselves.
Small children are.put into day care, trending toward the
well-nightuniversal practice of Russia and China.

There is

an ever-increasing demand by women's groups for more day care
centers and also for men to stay home part or full time and
take care of the children.

All this is a drastic, confused

and violent shake-up of values, with great repercussions
across the social board, the cultural patterns.

Especially

the family seems to be shaken, reduced in a significant
percentage of cases to a divorced woman and her one or two
children.

Yet deeper values don't change so drastically

en masse; it is likely that a counter movement will arise,
as Life-right has arisen to battle the victory of easy
abortion.
What are the effects of these changes, for the purpose
of this paper?

Totally unanticipated by Kluckhohn, whose

most significant value trend change noted under autonomy
and achievement was increasing socially constructive "collec
tive individualism" ("wish fulfillment?") (above and 1958as

10 1
* -

185-7, 20k), is this current intensification of competition
to achieve.
The effect of this thrust of women, blacks, Mexicans
and the other official minorities (as designated and supported
and favored by the United States government^) is to intensify
and worsen competition to achieve.

More and more women,

blacks, and others are, by peer pressure from organized
pressure groups, induced to partake of the American imperative
to achieve.

They are being stimulated and driven in their

assimilation of the dominant folk values to aspire to take
on the roles and high status heretofore achieved by white
males.

It can be foreseen that the pressures may escalate

well-nigh intolerably.

Competition and ultimate frustration

for the normative achievers, especially for white males who
for all the American generations have been socialized to
expect that they should attain success in high status positions,
may become dreadful.

It could pit person against person,

woman against man, in the most egocentric self-seeking way.
It could accelerate the divorce rate as men fail to measure
up to the expectations and/or job status of their wives.
Despite marginal rejections of the "system" by a few,
scores of highly and newly ambitious "newmen" or "new persons"
press forward, working, striving to exploit for their personal

^ I n 1972 a street paving firm, Souza Brothers,
entirely of Portuguese descent, was ruled ineligible and
had its longtime contract cancelled by the City of Oakland
by ruling of the dispensers of Federal Funds that the Souzas
were not an approved minority group.
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autonomous ascent this newly opened up equality of oppor
tunity.

This old American ideal, heretofore only fraction

ally realized, is now being pushed to the hilt.

No other

country has attempted so radical an equalization of oppor
tunity, and perhaps ultimately of status.

But within this

potential lie the seeds of great possible disillusionment
when the frustration De Tocqueville identified becomes
manifest— "most are doomed to relative disappointment in a
democracy."
Compounding the potential for social disruption is
the coincidence that this accelerated trend of intensifying

!

competition has occurred at a juncture when the reformist
movements have been successful in leveling off population
growth.

Thus, a sudden oversupply of qualified status-

seekers in many fields, notably in academia from Ph.D.'s
on down, is coincidental with an intensification of compe
tition to achieve.

A shift threatens in the American society's

cultural expectations from a norm of constant expansion with
its accompanying multiplication of opportunities for achieving
higher status, to a society of little or no growth.

This

could, and seems likely to, gradually throw the United States
back into the mentality of the post-medieval Europe that it
sought to escape, as it is faced with a static no-growth
structure.
In such a society opportunities are much more limited
for personal status achievement— akin to Foster's peasant
culture (1 9 6 5 ) of limited good'— where more for one means
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less for others.

There would likely be an Increasing economic

reward of more affluence for all, but with rising expecta
tions based on dominant American values, that is a minor
consideration.

The values of the culture place the goal

according to relative achievement, toiling to high status,
getting something "better than" (somebody else).

This

"crunch." would likely result in a high percentage of frus
trated people, and increase political and social instability,
threatening the practice of American democracy itself.
The question arises:
take over?

could other replacement values

At this writing, present social movements for

ever greater individual achievement, and for accelerating
achievement catch-up for those newly admitted to full compe
tition, seem to be growing in strength.

Since these achieve

ment drives are rooted more deeply in the basic drives of
the culture than the newly launched counter movements to
"cool" the drive, they would appear to be most likely to
continue ascendant.

The new ethic would urge fulfillment

in a limited vocational handicraft or some "non-productive"
or "genuinely creative" activity or group sharing instead
of own-ownership.

Though there is"this incipient latter

trend, it appears miniscule and highly unattractive so far.
It is noteworthy that militant leftwing or other collec
tive movement groups are consciously aware of the evils of
American individualism.

Most have made conscious efforts

to lessen the typical atomistic American autonomy and gain
collective reinforcement by cultivating group identity ties
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as Women's Liberation and Lesbians' "sisterhood", black
"soul brothers", La Raza Unlda, all somewhat akin to an
earlier generation's "Brotherhood" of Train Men.

Yet despite

this stress on collateral!ty— on brotherhood or sisterhood—
the result has been, with rare exceptions like the Black
Muslims, that these are now hotly aspiring people are basically
and deeply socialized in the main American value patterns.
They therefore operate along the autonomous achievement paths
of the mainstream values.

As Americans they are probably

unable to operate otherwise— -baring the exceptional value
changes that rarely forge new cohesive patterns of group
identities--as with the Muslims and Mormons and Hutterites.
It seems to require a religion, a supernatural sustenance,
a commitment to make such groupness work in the United
States.
Those from the subcultures, say of the ghetto or barrio,
heretofore not fully socialized in the mainstream, must in
order to compete already have or speedily must integrate
these individual achievement values and drive for success.
For "liberation" and "equality" means in large measure, in
the context of American culture, higher job successes and
definite measurable growth in relative incomes.
percent are at Grade level 15 ?

"What

What percent are tenured?"

For the bulk of the newly activated achievement race-runners,
like the blacks and the white women, the autonomy is cored
in already.

No change is necessary.

They already come from

an egocentric individualistic, non-collateral orientation.
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Latinos from a folk-culture sometimes must, along with
other adaptations to modern industrial society, make some
conversion to this orientation.

As in the case of Romano
12
Banuelos, Treasurer of the United States,
any lingering
collaterallty tends to be yielded in order to make the lone
climb up the individual ladder of success.
Creativity and Crack-ups.

Hsu suggested the possibility

of the conformity trait generating a constructive as well
as the stated negative corollary.
of "creative conflict":

Hsu's concept is that

he held (1963:222-227) that some

Americans react positively against the conformist norm, and
in so reacting come up with reformatory and creative move
ments.

In some sectors these alterations receive favorable

reception since in the value system creativity is deemed
good (change is good, change is progress).

So individuals

may escape psychologically the constraints of the system,
its imperative value patterns, through individual variations
amounting to escapes from conformity and cathexes (the
investment of emotional significance in an activity, object
or idea).

12

In evaluation:

since Hsu did not offer specific

In her climb from 17-year-old penniless immigrant
of 1 9 ^ » with two infants back in Juarez and no husband,
up to Treasurer of the United States in 1972, she allegedly
victimized fellow Mexican-Americans by paying substandard
wages in her Los Angeles tortilla factory. This she denies.
She is known as a hard-driving person; she was the founder
of a successful bank, the first Mexican-immigrant-oriented
bank in Los Angeles. She seems well integrated into the
mainstream American culture with the requisite autonomous
achievement success values. She contends that you have to
be "hard boiled", reject demands of compatriots for indul
gence, in order to get ahead.
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illustration, one can only indicate tenatively that the
idea may have merit.

It is not clear whether Hsu's "mavericks"

were tilting against the more superficial conformity that
suppresses eccentricity, "beards, or proper dress, or whether
they were successful protestants against the deeper confor
mity of needing group approval for their work achievement
and betokening life styles.

It was not stated how these

creative nonconformists would handle the dire imperative
of going along with the crowd in values.

Moreover, in some

areas, ostensible nonconformity might in reality be a form
of conformity since there are long-standing American values
sanctioning and approving newness, innovation, change for its
own sake.

In current lower educational circles professional

reputations seem to be built by School Superintendents
launching new systems— like ungraded classes, open classrooms,
heterogeneous groupings and the like.
yearly.

Some try a new system

In most fields, however, he who';.would start a real

alteration, like criticising operation of a bureau or trying
in higher education to transcend the departmental subject
matter jurisdictions, generally fail.
Yet creative alteration as a reaction to conformist
pressure is one explanation of how this conformist-in-value
society is so technologically innovative.

Changes in

technology are much more easily accepted than shifts in deeper
values, as in forgoing the lifetime achievement competition
or accepting a more intensive degree of local policing and
individual public responsibility.

Korea Misgivings s

The exper i e n c e s of the A m e r i c a n s

taken p r i s o n e r by the Communist Chinese during the K o rean
War

(Dahrendorf 196I : 193-^)»

1 9 5 0 “ 1953»

brings into q u e s t i o n

the a b s o l u t e value of a u t o n o m o u s achievement.

These e x p e r i 

ences ra i s e the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r valu e s that w e r e so
p r a g m a t i c a l l y effe c t i v e in the b u i l d i n g of Ame r i c a a r e as
effective in su s t a i n i n g a society,

or sustaining even i n d i 

v i d u a l life,

w h e n put

conditions.

These prisoners w e r e put to the u t t e r test of

a c t u a l survival.

to a cruel test u n d e r suppressive

They were subj e c t e d by their captors to

intensive value pressure.

Th e s e

"brain-washing"

clinics

c leverly e xploited the basic A m e r i c a n a u t o n o m o u s n e s s and
latent or p o t e n t i a l d i s trust of each m a n for the next.
They ac t e d on the s u p p o s i t i o n that e ach p e r s o n conceived
the ot h e r f r o m in f a n c y mor e as a c o m p e t i t o r than as a c o o p e r 
at i n g a l l y or friend.

From a l l evidence the captors were

able to r e d u c e several t housands of y o u n g A m e r i c a n s
n o n - r e l a t i n g c o l l e c t i o n of e g o c entric individuals,
blindly orien t e d only to his o w n welfare,
others'

survival.

to a
each

and callous to

Sick m e n w e r e t h r o w n out of the hutches

by their colleagues to die; m a n y put b l a n k e t s over their
heads a n d died,

th e i r will to live gone.

Of the total,

38$ died, t h o u g h they had sufficient rations.
the Turkish prisoners,
grou p - o r i e n t e d

In contrast,

who came f rom a n authoritarian,

(and h a r s h economic) background,

m a i n t a i n i n g their d i s c i p l i n e and coherence,
sick, m a i n t a i n i n g their integrity.

all survived,

caring for their

In evaluation;

These facts above have, in some inter-

preters' hands, been deemed not so damning to our culture,
in that perhaps the Chinese manipulators made much greater
and more skillful efforts to break down the Americans than
on the obdurate Turks, and perhaps these American soldiers,
being largely less-educE ^ed draftees, were unrepresentative
of the dominant middle class and its values.

Still, the

debacle raises the spectre that possibly these values may,
in fact, have serious internal defects that become apparent
when the society or the individual is put to great adverse
stress.

These men needed to cooperate and sustain one another,

but they were unable to.

The Chinese manipulators had

studied the American culture and unerringly struck at its
weak, non-supportive, aspects (perhaps they had read Hsu?
( 1 9 5 D )•

One explanation of the normal organizational effective
ness of Americans in contrast to this breakdown under extreme
pressure could be that institutional channels and sanctions
of school, job, and government as superimposed on the basic
autonomous urge to achieve, keep the American "programmed"

i'

and oriented to functioning effectively.

In response to

immediate institutional and socially approved rewards and
penalties, he works cooperatively and effectively with his
fellow workers or fellow tax-payers, though he always has
deep in his mind the competitive insecurity that he could be
laid off or fired— unlike the Japanese culture.

But remove

these institutional channels, their rewards, sanctions, and
supports, and a basic alienated, fearful-of-others personality
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takes over.

It is possible that there is lacking a suffi*

ciently strong internal "gyroscope" to keep the individual
steadfastness viable when the external social framework is
removed.

When said institutions/ are eliminated or their

control weakened the intrinsic volunteer patterns are too
weak to overcome the culture's autonomousness and get men to
cooperate— even when the alternative might be collapse and
death, one by one, individualistically.

Despite protestations

to the contrary, it is held that group sacrifice and commit
ment are alien to the culture.

These latter can be developed

under special conditions (Chapter 3) but the collaterality
background is not there to evoke.

This is a harsh judgment.

This breakdown in American behavior and sustaining
values is reminiscent of the possible effects of autonomous
values expressed in Cohen’s "Lone Bnotional Game" (Chapter
3, and 1966:2^-1), and in Henry's quote of De Tocqueville
(Chapter 3» and 1966:105-6): "The American had the feeling
that one stands alone, no one really cared whether one lived
or died."

This breakdown could also be related to Kandel

and Lesser's (1968:3^ 8-58 ..and Chapter

suggestion that

Americans operated more in response to external constraints
(than Danes), and had but weak internalized norms of behavior.
A reading of eye-witness accounts of some epochal
crisis situations in American history, such as the crossing
of the plains and mountains in the California Gold Hush,
with its hardships, social organization and disorganization,
yields some antecedents or forerunners of the later American

behavior under duress in Korea.

The prized Mwinning-of-the-

West" individualism also revealed a large coimponent of ego
centric, socially Irresponsible, every-man-for-himself behavior.
In their eagerness or greed to cover miles, win land, grasp
treasure, some Argonauts did cooperate loosely and fleetingly,
but many died, too, for lack of commitment to a cohesive
organization.

Of those who succeeded in crossing the continent,

many, if not the majority, ended up in the 1870's and l8 8 0 's
California as destitute derelicts, without family.
carved out his own career.

Each had

This sector of the American

character is worth more investigation— as a potential national
fault that, could contribute to national collapse under
sufficient duress.
Sub-Summary to Inferences Problematical.

In the section

above was presented a variety of authorities’ inferences on
the nature, development and effects of American cultural
trait-values associated with the thematic autonomy and
achievement.

Some inferences seemed to fit well, although

based on theories still in dispute, as that of very stringent,
very early toilet training producing compulsively anxious
personalities, e.g. the modal American (Murphey above).
Some challenged the fairly widespread historical view that
the modal American personality shifted from an 1800 model
of sturdy, self-reliant, self-directed personality to a
modern peer-directed conformist pattern.

Jules Henry's

companion view that the pioneer virtues were transformed
into modern vices was presented and then disputed, as not
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recognizing elements of continuity and internal (but para
doxical) consistency in cultural values evinced all the way,
1760 to i9 6 0 .

Counter views in support of some transforma

tion in socialization of the young during these historic
two American developmental centuries were presented.

Authori

ties like Benedict and i.su were cited for their ideas on
discontinuities in American socialization.

The theme of a

"lone emotional game" of both Cohen and, in his rather
singular social-critic way, Henry, was offered as an apparent
intrinsic trait stemming from the thematic pair.

Kluckhohn's

1950's appraisal items of noted and predicted value shifts

I
were explored and discussed to see how valid they seemed in
their manifestations 15 years later, and whether anything
fundamental in a shift in values was transpiring.

It turned

out that he predicted some value trends correctly and on
others he misprojected.

The questions posed by the social

and personality disorganization of the American captives of
the Chinese Communists in the Korean War were raised as possibly
an exposure of inherent weakness of the American value system.
Overall, this section was meant to be left open-ended
r
and exploratory. The explanations for unreconciled findings
were meant to be tentative and provide ideas for future
considerations.

In social science and in the study of American

culture there is much that is fluid, and there is much we
do not know, much data yet to be found, much paradoxical
phenomena still to be related.

However, where there was

seeming evidence of regularities, logical or possible cause
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and effect, it was so indicated.

Potential areas to be delved

deeper were suggested, such as the implications and possible
recurrence of the breakdown of the American prisoners of the
Chinese in Korea in the 1950 's »
Summary Assessments and Considerations
In this latter part of the chapter an overall, balanced
perspective will be sought.

The authorities cited throughout

this paper have been fairly well balanced.

One group con

sisted of those relatively critical of American society and
culture, such as Jules Henry, Margaret Clark and Barbara
Anderson, and Francis L. K. Hsu.

These were countervailed

with authorities largely approving, such as Clyde Kluckhohn,
Seymour Lipset.

A middle group were the considerable number

who called the traits as they saw them, neither pro nor con.
They found dynamic thrust in the balance of tensions, as in
the constructiveness of competition and the fear of for
sakenness in failure.

This group, from De Tocqueville to

Goldschmidt, meted out both approbation and social criticism.
However, since the negative effects of autonomy and achieve
ment and its reciprocals of conformity and insecurity have
constituted a considerable bulk of this paper's presentation,
it is pertinent to remark here for the sake of perspective,
that the American society and its culture has been one of
the most successful of all.

In terms of economic well-being

for most of its people, and of opportunity to rise, political
freedom of expression, individual career freedom, it has
been unequalled.

It has also been strong in pursuit of
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idealistic as well as material goals.

Of all large nations

the American has been the pioneer in lowering the barriers
of political participation to include successively poorer
or lower orders of people.

Especially lately, both through

idealism and guilty liberalism it has initiated programs
to compensate and afford greater achievement opportunity for
those from groups or ethnics adjudged rendered unfairly weak
by "the system" in the competitive race.

Through government

taxing and therefore partial wealth redistribution, it seeks
to provide low achievers a greater share in the ever-rising
minimum standards of living, including medical care, education
and job satisfaction,
Several cultural historical treatments of the 1950's
reaffirmed not only the continuities of American socio
political values but also the continuous ’thread of high
idealism, even if short-fallen in execution, of American
values and social practices— Daniel Boorstin (1953). Louis
M. Hartz (1955). Ralph Gabriel (1956) (in Lipset and Lowenthal, 1 9 6 1 ).
How then did these autonomous achievers, these insecure
conformists, these historic every-man-for-himself land
grabbers, achieve and build together such a nation of world
wide prominence, envy, and hope for the oppressed peoples and
nations?

Why has it continued to be the refuge for the

persecuted (whites), ranging from the Eastern European Jews
of the 1900's to the Cubans and the daughter of a Russian
dictator, Svetlana Stalin, in the 1960's?

Why is it that,
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for many, If not most of the world’s peoples, this American
society is still, even with its sum of individual insecurity,
considered the most desirable prototype society to emulate?
The national achievement answer seems to lie in the paradox,
the thesis-antithesis, that the "independent” anti-authority
Individualist American also carries a culturally indigenous
trait of willingness to submit and cooperate effectively with
and in and under the direction of a formal government operation
However, for an American so to submit and cooperate, the
circumstances of time and situation must indicate such
subordination as a generally acceptable proposition.

The

"ppers" must be convinced— public opinion must so indicate.
The waging of World War II represented full public support
and peer pressure.

The necessity of recalling all American

ground troops in Viet Nam after 1968 represented the with
drawal of public support— and peer pressure.
In this government, the beneficiary of a thousand years
of English trial and error and gradually crafted democracy,
the American political culture contained also the elements
of working to compromise.

The normative person would /submit

to compulsion of taxing, and ultimately even the historically
rejected "Old World" bodily draft ("conscription") providing
that in public opinion (peer standards) it w a s ,considered
really justified.

This could be considered the essence of

democracy, though possibly not by those resisting conscription.
Perhaps the covert conformity trait, the need for public
approval, facilitated this acceptance of the compulsory hand
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of government, even though this government control was
historically resented and on lesser issues was often stymied,
Emerson said that a good citizen should not obey the laws
too well.

The residual feeling of 200 years of anti-authority

still flows in the ambivalent public attitude toward the
13
police and law enforcement.
So through American history we have had the conflict of
authority versus freedom.

Youth would grow up, reject

parental and township authority, and yet settle further west
in their maturity and establish new authority.

In the new

settlements a community concensus would grudgingly tax them
selves as the need became manifest.

Through the ideological

objections of Old Time Liberalism these transplanted posts
of American society would be slower to tax, slower to control

13

This antithesis emerges strikingly in the Berkeley
scene.,’ This atypical, but possibly bellwether forerunnertype community has recently generated surprising grass roots
volunteer social efforts, as when the "people" took by force
State (.University of California) property for a "Peoples
Park." They leveled the fence twice, in 1969 and 1971* In
a paradoxical way, it has become a conservator or reinstigator
of old frontier, anti-government populist values, at least
in terms of public control of people's persons.
Yet the Council majority like Populists of old (or
Socialists of the future) have been eager to use the taxing
power of their government to "soak the rich" and affluent,
and even small holders, by levying of rent control laws and
greatly increased business license fees.
The City Council's avowed "radicals" torn between responsi
bility as the people's representatives and this latent popu
lism— "government is bad"— reflect this old American ambiguity.
In 1971 Oakland took advantage of a Federal grant for a police
helicopter; Berkeley rejected the same, fearing "Big Brother's"
surveillance. Physically, the cities merge into one another,
but the values differ, showing variations, or possibly stages
in development.
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the freedom of property and the individual self-determination
of disposal of his income than in the old European or Japanese
cultures.

In America, in attaining collective community

betterment, there was considerable time lag compared to older
more historic societies.

There was much resistance to

instituting programs and taxing and getting acceptance of
the loss of some individual freedom.

Surprisingly, these

anti-government individualists generally, in time, paid their
taxes, though the arch, old-time typical Appalachian moun
taineers enjoyed defying the Revenue Man, avoiding the payment
of "moonshine" taxes.

Even today a 100-year-old American

town such as Missoula is apt to have much less communityenhancing development and controls as central square malls,
community-sponsored cafe-gathering centers, elimination of
wrecked auto hulks and debris about town, preservation of
old landmarks, in comparison to a German, Swiss, Scandinavian,
or even old New England town.
So a national government emerged that could do a minimal
job, a regular Army was created that was allowed barely
enough strength to cope with Indian uprisings.

A dual,

complicated system of courts, State and Federal, was insti
tuted in fear of concentrated, monolithic power.

These

court systems grew enormously, accruing great and decisive
power as they carried out law in an especially complex,
litigation-rife fashion.

This reflected a need for govern

ment control or umpire institutions, after all.

Time after

time the trait for legal security coped with the illegal
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frontier avarice in occupation of land.

"Squatter Sover

eignty" was frequently legitimized as a fait accompli, as
with the "Sooners", who slipped into Oklahoma prior to
l889t and with the Pre-emption Acts.

The juxtaposition of

the hunger for property and the need for order was recognized
in laws legitimizing muon frontier individual jungle law.
So a web of commerce developed, basically privately owned,
and profit- (individual achievement)-motivated, yet under a
governmental protective web, that of late has grown so that
its branches encompass most Americans in one way or another.
The old-time tacitly accepted minimal government has become
i

enormously large and powerful, therefore strongly decisive,
yet the tension between private and public continues into
housing, into use of resources.

The United States' society's

culture, a daughter of England's, carries a unique inter
play, an interweaving or jousting of these twain antithetical
values.

The accumulative effects of egocentricities have

been, nationally speaking, mitigated by the acceptance of
governmental controls and services.
The process has, in fact, not been so different from the
trend perceived in 19 58 by Kluckhohn, toward "collective
individualism", except that it is much more vested in agencies
of government control with much subordination of the indi
vidual, than he expected.

This system of democratic govern

ment compulsion as a substitute for voluntary collateral
cohesion was working all the while.

It worked poorly with

the Pantexes (Chapter 1), more effectively in a modern
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California town, with its myriad codes, where unpaved streets
or unplumbed houses are generally no longer permitted.
Lately., governmental "collectivism" has taken in much more
terrain, from the early, simple township government services
of schools and constables to the modern massive system of
federally backed loans, state pollution standards, aid to
dependent children and tax money spent for the hungry of
India or for bombs in the Vietnam War.

Kluckhohn favored

the type of "collective individualism" that operated in
volunteer social uplift sectors— working for more art, civic
improvement, libraries, educational facilities.

These

volunteer-supported groups have burgeoned, also, but rela
tively much less than the constraint management of government
Federal, State, City, County, School, Special Districts—
tax upon tax, public services and control upon control and
management.

Thus the affluent incomes won from differential

achievement have been redistributed somewhat— not enough
for Socialists but far too much from a 1900 American view.
Thus the normative autonomous American operated
successively from the frontier into settled communities of
ever-increasing community life, using some few volunteer
organizations, such as fire departments.

Most significantly,

the normative American's life career was fulfilled in a web
of business and government organizations.

From the 1880's

giant corporation, through the giant government of 1900 and
especially since 1933 » the web has grown, the percent of
people working for someone else has increased, to become the
norm.

Though the normative American continued personally
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autqnomous, his necessary acceptance of direction, discipline,
and labor-coordinating control of, say, the Northern Pacific
Ballroad, made this autonomous achiever in fact a collateral
achiever in his work-day, work-life organization.

But this

collateral!ty had no deep kinship or permanently enduring
affilial ties.

It was more a loose confraternity of, say,

mobile railroad telegraphers like Chet Huntley's father
Pat (Huntley 1968:155) •

Initially the small company, then

the giant corporation, and latterly the giant government
has supplied the American society the necessary organization,
productive efficiency facilities and the work-a-day social
cohesion.

These institutional surrogates have operated

somewhat in place of the ties and supports of lineality
and collateral!ty (See Chapter 3, Caudill and Scarr 1962:53“

91, and Florence Kluckhohn 1950*382-3) that had been largely
eliminated from American culture prior to, during, and
shortly subsequent to, the ocean crossing from Mother England.
Motivating achievement factors included pride in achievement,
hope of climbing to higher status, some satisfaction either
in developing one's own "spread" (ranch) or farmstead,i
store, or, increasingly, in attaining a responsible role
in a business, corporation, or in times of stress for the
nation, in the military, and lately in government organization.
These were the gears, the machinery furnishing billets, work
opportunities, that enabled the autonomous achiever to,
in effect, work cooperatively and build up his wealth and
status, and that of the United States.
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■ Kluckhohn's last word (1958^:165-7) was that the auto
nomy, the orientation to individual achievement, was still
the core motivating force, and a dedicated grasping privatism
went along concomitantly (though he hopefully discerned
trends toward amelioration).

Thus the normative American

who was forced (in the case of Pat Huntley) by his failure
in pioneering

lA

and by Industrialization, to work for the

big corporation, still adhered to his goals of making his
way independently of help or hindrance from kinfolk, and
regardless of his town or class or origin.

As ever in

American history the dominant values held him responsible
/

for supporting his nuclear family (only), He jealously guarded
what wealth or home he could acquire.

He was ignorant of

the extent to which his values were molded into a confor
mist pattern of lone achievement, since he was socialized
to believe that there was no acceptable alternative— even a
military career in 1920 was very suspect,

Kluckhohn, more

over (1958a:187), argued somewhat contrarlly and perhaps
idealistically that Americans might conform exteriorly in
order to husband their psychic energy inwardly to develop
their unique personal potential (See Hsu's oathexes,
Chapter

k

and 1963:223-227).

This the writer would deem

a goal achieved perhaps by a small minority, but not by the
dominant majority socialized to be dependent on public
approval.

■^Most of those attempting to homestead in Northern
Montana, 1910-192^-, were so doomed.
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has no compunctions about forsaking his roots, his hometown,
his homeclass, his old friends.

The conformity comes in

molding his career along expected lines of promotion and
advancement, which leads to the judgment that the striver is
an "operator", the classic Dick-Nixon-llke opportunist who
allegedly lacks integrity (Whyte 1956:5, 6 , 11, 135)•

However,

it could equally be said that this constant "trimming" and
adjusting of the normative American shows great social
acuity and consideration of others (peers and bosses) in
adapting to new situations, new demands, new sets of people,^
(Lipset 1963:132).

Only a few can go the whole route,

"to the top," zigzagging their way upward.

The Huntley

father, b o m in Wisconsin as one of seven children, moved
west at adulthood, was bested in his Montana homestead
attempt, 1913 - 1920 , and ended up as a lifetime railroad
telegrapher.

He was closer to average than an Andrew Carnegie.

But he and Carnegie shared those same achievement values,
Pat Huntley would unquestionably have made the climbing
zigzag had his opportunity opened up.

His son did.

Histori

cally, we would never have heard of these normative men,
Pat Huntley and John Anderson Truman, except for the chance
of their sons' exceptional achievements.

•^Studies indicate that those who move about geographi
cally and those who move up status-wise, tend to have signi
ficantly greater chance of heart attack than those who stay
put. The latter achieve less and live longer— Harry Truman
excepted.
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The working out of autonomy and achievement has also
been in the context of a fuzzily-held but pervasive value
equality.

According to the frontier and Declaration of

Independence^ ethos Americans were supposed to be equal
in that one man was as good as another, until he proved
he was better.

Each man was entitled to equal treatment

before the law, unless he could pull strings for preferential
treatment.

Each man should have the same opportunity to

rise, though it helped to marry the boss's or richest man's
daughter, as did Abraham Lincoln,

Each man should be

addressed by a common equalitarian term, unless he could
/

get elected and be referred to as the "Honorable."

These

somewhat conflicting values have continued in uneasy asso
ciation.

Their on-going manifestations are presented in

the paradoxes between adherence to equality and (differen
tial) achievement— the basic American need to feel superior
to someone (Henry above, and 1$66).

Sometimes these values

reinforced or moderated one another (Lipset, 1963:123)*
for instance, the feeling that the effect of the special
favoritism and "pull" (examples above) should be minimized.
•

\

And the highly individually competitive United States' society

Hofstadter felt that at theotime the Declaration of
Independence was written, the phrase about equality actually
meant only that an American was equal to an Englishman of
the same class, but as later interpreted has come to mean
that every man is (potentially) as good as another. Children
start the race of life with equal opportunity to succeed.
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has minimized these greatly with its merit system and merit
ocracy, as compared to more traditional collaterally-oriented
societies as in Iatin America, Africa, Asia, though the latter
have decried the American system as cold, heartless, devoid
of sustaining ties.
Individually, achievement has been the cultural tyrant.
If a man proved he was "better" he attained £>owerr' and position.
Then he was entitled to enjoy the benefits.

Those who proved

themselves to be less good or to be "losers" should "take
their medicine", sometimes attributed to "luck."

This value

pattern also produced those ill effects of the "loser" or
even middle achievers, who, feeling themselves mediocrity
failures, succumbed to the corrosive effects of normlessness,
especially in the middle and later years (Clark & Anderson
1967:11-18, 325)•

Goldschmidt held that though it produced

much achievement, this American system also produced much
seeming failure— failure to achieve as much as the better of
one's peers.

He held that the .system resulted in much family

and personal tension, whether the individual was deemed a
failure or a success (1955:1216),

Prom these writers'

studies and from Henry's, and from participant observation,
this writer’s opinion is that these losses, these frustrations
and self-doubts of those who have hit their status ceiling,'
is probably much more widespread and debilitating than has
so far been revealed.

Other reports by psychologists and

psychiatrists, and contacts with people, indicate a widespread
Incidence of this malaise.

However, most men would tend to

12?
keep it unexpressed, as public confession of failure would be
damning for an American of the dominant cultural pattern.

De

Tocqueville said that if a man fails in self-reliance, if he
falters, is a "loser", then he feels forsaken, impotent, his
peers are unsympathetic and tend to abandon him (Henry 1 9 6 3 :6 ).
Loneliness:

Another penalty paid for this autonomy-

achievement orientation, in the opinion of several authorities,
is that the normative American experiences a great sense of
loneliness, not just when aged but all along the life line.

Cohen (Chapter 3 and 1966:2^1) stressed the "lone emotional
game."

Brodbeck (1961:^3) especially found this theme of

loneliness all through American history, from the obvious
lonely plains on through to teeming but impersonal cities
and the autonomy of suburbia.

In the American patterns this

loneliness may arise from the aforesaid lack of collateral!ty,
extended family or group ties, lack of lineality, lack of roots
as mobility and status-climbing shuttles the individual about—
often more than a thousand miles from his home source, roots.

18

■^The Japanese view the American system of laying off
people from their jobs as barbaric.
Recently, in 1970-1971,
American scientists and engineers, as well as blue collar
workers, experienced overnight the collapse of their statussupported world, as their jobs disappeared without warning.
1R
In American epic cowboy films, the lone rider, seemingly
without background or family connections, without roots,
courageously and often singlehandedly coping with adverse
nature and malevolent humans, is a recurring theme— as in
Shane and Will Penny. In the end, the hero generally rides
off toward more anonymity, if not oblivion. Herein may be
found a symbol of many lives.

17
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Also, the aforementioned fear of Involvement, the widespread
distaste of getting too close to others, the fear of emotional
demands, all tend to isolate.

Nevertheless, human need for

close contact continues unabated.

Hence, as Henry indicated

(1 9 6 3 s1^ 5 )i extreme emotional demands are put upon the only
outlet left for viable close human contacts, the nuclear
family.

Sometimes the strain on two (or one) frail parents,

beset with job and outside concerns,,is too much.

Emotions

and frustrations boil over in violence, and/or the sociali
zation and personality of the children suffer— the result is
a new generation that is even more isolated.

Some, parent

and child, maintain emotional barriers even within this
minimal family, avoid closeness, retreat into their protective
autonomy, yet are highly conscious that one should strive
to be "well liked" outside the family— by the peers (Henry
1963:323,1^9).
Unchanging Values; Peer Approval.

Peer approval, as

a major determinant of the normative man's status and there
fore self worth rather than self approval, the "innerdirected" personality— if it ever really existed— appears
as imperative now as was noted in Chapter 2 in the various
historical observations and evaluations.

Greater democrati

zation of government bodies and advisory boards enhance this
power, as 18-year-olds are put on Planning Commissions,
workers get more say in management, colleges share part of
their governance with faculty senates, and college committees
allow students to participate in decision-making.

A kind
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of nascent work-stead collaterally system is thus cultivated.
It differs from the unique Japanese workstead-as-family,
boss-as-father setup, in that the American individual is
competing without security (unlike the Japanese) in a "driven"
way with the same peers who are also judging him.

As Lipset

quoted Riesman:
We can contrast the small grocer who must
please his individual patrons, perhaps by a
"counter-side" manner with the chain store employee
who must please both the patrons and his co
workers, ..
The colleague, like the peer-group, is the
very person with whom one engages in competition
for the scarce commodity of approval and the very
person to whom one looks for guidance as to what
is desirable (Lipset 1963:131)*
Of course there is still the boss insisting on high standards
of performance and meticulous conformity in work patterns
and associated values.
ential, too.

Yet the peers are powerfully influ

For instance, though most metropolitan news

papers are owned and directed at the highest levels by
political conservatives, the pressure of the working newsmen,
reporters, and editing staff has since i 960 become so pre
vailingly, and overwhelmingly, liberal-socialist that the
news and syndicated columns tend to have a "liberal slant."
Often the content of the newspaper is at variance with the
editorials (see The Mlssoulian, New York Times, San Francisco
Chronicle).
approval.

Note the above italicized scarce commodity of
Approval, akin to status, or along with status,

is always in short supply.

There is not enough to go around,

so powerful cultural pressures for conformity continue.
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When they slacken in one way, say for social acceptance of
homosexuals, or of couples living together out of wedlock,
or of avoidance of the draft, they usually tighten in
another, as the peer group pressure gets more levers.
The Protestant Ethic "Engine."

Equally powerful and

equally influential on the achievement value ("syndrome",
some would say) is the embodiment, the characterization of
the work-is-virtuous value, that the historians inaccurately
20
label the Protestant Ethic.
Periodically avant garde
social observers adjudge the trait obsolete, dying or dead.
Originally this value was religiously conceived by the
1600*s Calvinistic Puritans as allied to salvation.

In time,

by the 1 8 0 0 's, it was modified secularly to equate goodness
and morality with success.

Through American history this

moral value of the drive to achieve, the worship of success
has, especially in the American modal character, consciously
or unconsciously been a mighty ideological and folk value
reinforcement of the autonomous achievement ethic.

A man

deemed good succeeds careerwise and financially, and gains
status and respect,
able worth.

A man who does not succeed is of question

His status is relatively undesirable; his char

acter is suspect.

20

"Puritan Ethic" would have been a more apt rubric
recognizing the English and American Calvinistic origins of
the concept. Actually, Catholic peasants from Europe in the
1900's carried this value into the U.S. just as strongly as
Protestants. The 70 years' experience of the local (Alameda
County, northern California) Catholic Portuguese reflected hard
work and belief in hard work, saving, and delayed gratification,
as much as any Northern European Protestant...Like the old
Puritans they judged a man partly on how hard he worked, and
partly on how much success he made with it.
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Ralf Dahrendorf (1961s205)t a German observer of
American values, held that the alleged decline of the Pro
testant Ethic was highly premature; that the actual decline
of the work-success ethic in the dominant majority was nil,
It continued to be almost the most dominant value of the
mainstream culture, wheie a man to be respected must work
hard and.we 11 to achieve, attaining heights publicly approved.
Ten years after Dahrendorf, despite the "counter culture",
the growth of "street people", of a few mainstream "drop
outs" who do not compete, there has been no mainstream
lessening of this drive to success.

If anything it has

intensified as it has broadened to include not only financial
success as businessmen but acceptable alternates for the
liberals who reject direct profit-making success.

It has

included ever more strongly aspirations to achieve as selfemployed or semi-independent professionals— doctors, lawyers,
scientists, planning consultants, marriage counselors, edu
cational specialists, university professors, journalistic
pundits.

Most of these have come to constitute a new status

elite initiated through the competitive rites of threshhold
achievement in postgraduate studies, a system roughly
parallel to the classic Chinese scholar-gentry system.
As noted above, the "able operator", if he is in a
position to do so, avoids retirement and consequent loss of
status to the end.

Multi-millionaire Kennedy^ and Rocke

fellers continue to work all their lives, well past 6 5 «
Roger M. Blough, who "retired" as Chairman of the United
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States Steel Corporation in 19^9» and. who is financially
well off with a $70,000 annual pension, continues to work
full time

practicing law in his old firm,

James Roche, who

"retired"

in 1971 asChairman of General Motors,

steadily on many boards and directorships.

works

Activity and

achievement are still the mainsprizes, preoccupations, and
sources of status, the "greening of America" notwithstanding.
To counterbalance somewhat the unfavorable picture of
American culture produced by the reiteration of the negative
reciprocals of the thematic pair of traits, like conformity
and insecurity, it should be stated that the culture carries
also strong positive
balancing

traits and values,

A major counter

trait in the national ethos and in the cultural

patterns has been the deep-seated American optimism (briefly
listed in the enumeration at the end of Chapter 2).

The

normative American was idealistic and/or optimistic in his
faith in the expected growth and role of his country, and
of the future world development with the United States as
leader and exemplar.

This was the outgrowth, the national

sum of his optimistic outlook on his own career development
and success.

For the United States’had never lost a war,"

had always been a success.

American economic and social

progress on the whole was ever upward, and most individuals,
if they worked hard, prospered.

Interestingly, when the

individual reached his ceiling, or suffered a setback, he
might become disillusioned as far as his own fate went, but
his generalized notion was that his children and other people
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would "make it."

When the Big Depression (1929-1933) jolted

2 5% of the people out of their jobs, and 50 $ were done out

of their savings, there occurred the first period of uncertain
questioning, but by the 19^0's with the great American
accomplishments in World War II, and subsequent prosperity,
the general optimistic outlook returned.

This feeling pre

vailed in the 1950's, deemed by critics to be smugness.

Yet

the vicissitudes of the 1 9 3 0 's permanently modified this
optimism toward the normative American's grasping at govern
ment-guaranteed social security.
Due to the national confidence crisis of the disillusioned

I

Vietnam Era, 1965-1972, and due to the slowing down of growth
opportunities, a dark mood of pessimism lately permeates
the writings of many intellectuals, akin to the expatriates
of the 1920's such as Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway,
and similar to the critical expressions of the 1 9 3 0 's,
America has thus frequently been categorized by its own
critics as a "sick society, a racist, exploitive, eonsumptionmad society."

Yet the modal American remains on the whole

guardedly optimistic.

He still seems to remain convinced

that things will turn out all right.

This steady optimism

is not easily reconciled with the stress of the earlier
part of this chapter on insecurity, tension, feelings of
frustration at middle-aged mediocrity, and the oldsters'
overwhelming feelings of failure and alienation.
This may be due to the American norm of values being
set by the highly successful people and buoyant, indulged,

13^
"you-can-be-anything-you-want-to-be" youth.

And the majority

in middle age can look back to moderately good achievement
in terms of possessions— cars, home, suburban location.
Those who, despite their possessions, suffer from relative
lesser or non-achievement, and who suffer the damaging effects
of autonomous alienation, possibly may condemn themselves
as deviate, at fault.

However, to avoid further isolation,

they may dutifully express optimism to the outside world,

and especially to their children— to give them the proper
start in life.

For youth, vigor, optimism, and achievement
21
are fundamentals in the American way.
Possibly this American paradox of achievement and inse
curity is an inherent, viable part of a constructive, workable
value system--with some modifications.

If this system could

be adjusted to bring into full participation these multitudes
of collections of lone individuals who, in their own or peer
opinion (peer meaning successful and/or youthful people)
are not "making it", and who are but "tenuously connected
with the 'living'," the successful producers,

Some incor

poration of features of the excellent Mormon system of
everybody participating, everybody being of some consequence,

21

Political figures like Jack Kennedy, even with the
handicaps of a bad back and chronic sickness, carefully
cultivate their youthful, vigorous image. While seeking
and fighting to hold status, Iyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon,
and Hubert Humphrey all dyed their gray hair black. George
Miller, Democratic representative in Congress, was, despite
a 30-year liberal record in Congress, defeated in the 1972
primary, largely because "he was too old— 80-odd— and not
up with the times."
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might be the direction in which to move (O'Dea 1957*18^)«
Proto European.

22

This paper’s stress on those aspects

special to the American cultural pattern should not be
taken in distorted degree in comparison with European develop
ments.

Most of this American divergent stress and singular

development sprang from the parent British cultural matrix.
Thus these main American developments have been extended and
magnified projections of already budding West European trends—
as for example the trend toward individualism,

curtailment

of the family to the conjugal unit, and the like.

Once Ameri

can society took the lead it became the forerunner of parallel,
though laggard, Western European developments.

In the

aspiration for individual fulfillment the American pattern
has developed as the accelerated pilot-project, the prototype
of the eventual paths that the Western World, if not the
whole globe, has taken or will likely take.

These value-

trait paths include the trends toward autonomous individual
achievement, toward social and geographic mobility, toward
overall group conformity in behavior and values and toward
increasing stress on the attaining of relatively higher
status.

Especially the notion of non-resignation, the

refusal to accept one's fate, appears in the 20th century
to have become a world-wide value.

Some of these so-called

"Americanization" movements, as toward individual autonomous

22A non-Mormon critic in 1903» Bichard T. Ely, held the
Mormon social system to be one of the most perfect participatory
systems found anywhere (O'Dea 1957*185 )• It is notable that
Mormons needing help, even in old age, are required to do some
work within their capacities.
This is in accord with folk socie
ties where every member participates according to his ability.

136
living made possible by affluence can be seen in developments
of the last twenty years in Western Europe, and even in
Japan where the aged are beginning to feel unwanted and
useless.

Crossroads:

Exterior Controls-Partlclpation Need.

As seen by Lowenthal (1^61:3^-36) these American trends
were the .outgrowths of nascent European trends.

In contem

porary Europe growth was slower in comparison to the outburst
of property accretion marking successful achievements of the
"driven" egoistic normative Americans, characteristic of the
epoch 1700 to 1900.

In America this explosion of achievement
/
was made possible by the exploitation of the resources of
a new continent, but the catalytic agent was the cultural
pattern— the vigor of her youth-oriented, driving,
people.

"driven"

This American explosion occurred so quickly and,

in terms of prior slow labors, relatively faoilely, that this
growth outran checks and constraints desirable for the good
of the community.
had to come.

Eventually a day of public reckoning

As an example, to combat the wastage of

natural resources, conservation and ecology movements are

I

inaugurating more constraints on the cherished individual
soonomic freedoms.

In the interest of air purity and conser

vation of fuel3, the private auto operator will submit to
more and more restraints.

These conservation oriented

public-spirited "Liberals" will become ever more the constrainers
and controllers of society.

Europe may escape some of this

historic American sequence of unbridled egocentrism—
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"individualism".

It may cope better, making gradual adjust

ments apace with the slower growth of its countries, adapting
their continuously-evolved control institutions and supporting
values, as has England.

Asian Communist societies are taking

an apparently effective approach that is fully collective,
anti-individualistic, totally controlled.
Perhaps the human wastage of spirit cited above in
Henry and in Clark and Anderson should indicate some such
conservation of people, too.

This would entail a drastic

restructuring of values and priorities, a consciously directed
social shift, a break with the past.

Yet England in 1820-1850

managed a considerable turn-about in popular values in
winning respect for authority, inculcating civility among
its people, achieving a reduction in crime and an enhancement
of civic feeling.

Through conscious effort the British

developed and won popular support for these values as the
dominant norm.

Possibly some such application of the renowned

American skills in operating big organizations could be made
to rearrange the work system to utilize the autonomous
achieving individual's skill effectively, but more humanely
than at present.

The goal would be to give the individual

a sense of belonging, a feeling of consequence In his vast
society.

Kindredly, the whole social mechanism might stand

some tinkering into, with the aim of making each person
more a permanent interacting part, with at least a little
stake and participation in the same, of mattering so long as
he lives.

Henry deemed this widespread feeling of inconse
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quentialness amounting to worthlessness as our. greatest
American social defect.

Henry himself did not reach an

earthly stage of obsolescence, nor one of being "entombed"
23
in the abhorred aged care home. ^
The question is still posed whether America's great
enterprising accomplishments, this historic carving out
of the 20th century's preeminent national position in wealth
and power as well as the highest standard of living per
capita,', is worth the stress price.

Is this foremost position

not only in technological attainments but, since the 1930's,
in art, music, literature, television, and university learning,
worth the anxieties, insecurities, and failure feelings
endemic under the surface of the mainstream?
be contingent upon the other?

Need the one

Clyde Kluckhohn (1958a:206)

quoted Eugene'Burdick's 19^9 posing of the question:
In England there is none of the rise and fall,
the massive brooding anxiety, the creative stabbing
of self doubt, the tortures of ethnic inadequacy
that one finds to a marked degree in America...
It is impossible that England today could produce
a Shakespeare while the United States or Asia might.
In this man-eating neurotic America there are
enormous creative currents.
Those English who see only our chrome plating...

^Jules Henry, 1904-1969, Professor of Anthropology,
Washington University, St. Louis, died "in the saddle"
September 23, 1969, without having to undergo the old age
he found our society dreading, disguising and rejecting.
He was of a generation that got its professional start with
and at the end of Franz Boas' career, aided by the tutelage
of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict (Gould 1971:788-792).
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and roaring vulgarity are, understandably, not
attuned to something vaster that turns and weaves
just below the surface of American life like some
raging caged and almost invisible beast.
This beast may destroy us while England is still
competent and serene.
Burdick went on to become a popular professor of
Political Science at Berkeley, well-liked by his colleagues;
then the creator of two best sellers, The Ninth Wave and
the Ugly American.

He achieved doubly high status as a

millionaire and full Professor,

suffered estrangement from

wife and family, allegedly carried heavy psychic burdens,
and keeled over dead on the tennis court in his ^O's.
Autonomous Achievement.

Chapter 5
SUMMARY
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of the associated
trait values of autonomy and achievement.

Their significance

in American society and its hierarchy of values was illus
trated by the findings of the Rimrock, New Mexico, study in
the 1950's, wherein settlers from the Oklahoma-Texas Panhandle
areas were identified as archetypical representatives and
therefore cultural carriers of old-time American values.
These characteristic patterns as measured in intensity
by various tests and as corroborated and illustrated in the
nature of community activities critically observed by the
anthropologists, were contrasted with the significantly
deviate patterns of the adjacent Mormons.

The latter,

though also largely mainstream in culture, were deemed
distinctive in consciously raising "volunteer" collective
values and institutionalized group restrains and resultant
behaviors to a level approaching equal status with the
I
normatively more dominant individual achievement.
It was found that both Mormons and "Pantexes" shared
to a high degree the American values of thrift, hard work,
and optimism.

However, they differed significantly in

that the Pantexes put greater value on individual autonomous
achievement— if need be, divorced from the parent community
and kindred ties— whereas the Mormons tended to aspire and
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achieve within a more collateral framework, within and
for the group.

The Pantexes were more egocentric in orien

tation? the Mormons’ individual aspiration was more subor
dinated to group pressures, needs, and approvals.

It was

noted that the characteristic Pantexes* individualistic
orientation was a product of their culture, a conforming
to the group expectations, to which they had been socialized
since childhood.

Hence, the freedom of this most represen

tative group from routine collective constraint actually
embodied the directional constrains of impelling the individuals
to strive mightily for individual success, but especially
In ways winning public approval and, hopefully, renown.
Within the Pantex value system public approval of its
reference group— its neighborhood embodiment of American
culture and social values as a whole— was just as significant
and decisive as was the Mormon need to win approval of
fellow Mormons, in the village and at the national head
quarters in Utah.
In Chapter 2 the early American experience as it ori
ginated In the culture of England of the 1500's, then was
transposed and transformed somewhat in New England and the
East Coast in the l600's and 1700's, was studied through
the eyes of contemporary observers, including Alexis De
Tocqueville.

The comments of these observers were interpreted

by later social scientists, who concluded that the roots
and manifestations of autonomous achievement were already
present in the 1700's and 1800's.

They stemmed largely
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from British traits, but blossomed more rapidly and per
vasively in the lesser restrictions and greater opportunities
of the American setting.

Autonomous achievement flourished

along with associated traits of anti-authority and belief
in individualism— self determination of career, aspiration,
milieu, and family choices.
Other basic American traits included pragmatism,
optimism, change-is-desirable, wasteful living, generosity,
idealism, deference to women, pursuit of pleasure, social
and geographic mobility.

Equally significant was the

acquisitive spirit, as property acquisition was always a
high goal.

The ideal of perfectability went along with a

self-righteous moral!sm.

Most paradoxical in incompatibility

of values was the ostensible respect for law and order and
lawfulness that operated in continual tension with a deep
egocentric bent toward taking the law into one's own hands.
This contradiction was associated with a kind of perverse
admiration for defiance of authority.
Over a period of 200 years from the 1650's to the 1840's,
it was found that these observers were, in broad outline,
in remarkable agreement as to the dominant value patterns
as expressed in the socialization of children and subsequent
behavior of adults.

Americans generally were much less
r

respectful of the authority of the state, of community
leaders, of their family and parents, than were people in
Western Europe.

They were trained to operate independently,

to "think for themselves."

Generation after generation

1^3
struck out on their own, moving west or away-to-town.
Each successive generation tended to feel that it existed
somewhat by Itself, unbeholden to past generations, free
to "do its own thing."

But each was subject to the ironclad

law that it must take care of itself.

Each individual had

to carve out his own career, to succeed or fail on his own.
Success won resounding approvals failure was considered a
defect of the character, mitigated perhaps by the understanding
that it was due to bad luck, though "real successful people
don't have bad luck."
The observers confirmed De Tocqueville's concept of
"tyranny of the majority," that the real authority was peer
power.

This dominant American concern with outside approval

produced individuals fearful of and vulnerable to public
approval or disapproval.

Therefore the American's indivi

dualism had to be expressed in a conformist pattern of doing
what the peers expected.

This was significant in that the

average American did not, and probably does not now, under
stand and appreciate how his "individualism" was and is so
highly conditioned by conformity to the culture's norms
of expectation of success and concomitant fear of failure.
Associated with this individualism, these observers determined,
was a great isolation of the individual; therefore loneliness
and alienation constituted pervasive norms.
Hence this chapter developed the historical roots of
the unique American complex or paradox.

Normatively, this

counterbalance of traits produced a tension whereby the

12j4
autonomous achievement imperative caused dominant individuals
to strike out alone and accomplish much in the economic and
professional spheres.

But they paid the price of being

cut off from their roots, and walled off from their fellow
men, except for transitory, insecure, shallow work relation
ships.

Another part of the price was the lack of inner

security since the norm of worth depended on one's attain
ments relative to the best of one's peers— in ways approved
by the society of peers.
easily lost.

Peer approval therefore could be

Peer approval depended on how much one had

accomplished lately, as seen and weighed publicly.
In Chapter 3 the historical findings of Chapter 2
were validated by the researches of 20th century anthro
pologists, historians, and sociologists.

Through their

own studies of the American culture, and through crosscultural studies of American values compared with Russian,
German, Japanese, English and Chinese, a generally consistent
agreement was reached.

These scholars' findings were in

accord as to the character and dominance of autonomousness—
independent self oriented decision-makingr-and achievement—
the awesome drive for attaining high job status regardless
of ties of family, friends, home base.
Their findings as to the paramountcy, pervasiveness
and general nature of these traits were so consistent as
to be repetitious.

They validated the historical chapter

and much of the initial determinations of Chapter 1.

They

agreed that the seeming independence and individuality of
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the American, the purely individual striving of the modal
personality, in reality masked an unconscious pervasive
social control Impelling the modal American to strive along
mainstream patterns of conformity.
As expected, there were great discrepancies between
the conclusions of the i^searchers and the idealized American
maxims of cooperation, overt veneration of the aged, and
devotion of family ties.

These controversial items were

therefore further re-examined in the fourth Chapter.
These authorities tended also to confirm the negative
reciprocals associated with the stress on autonomous achieve
ment.

This Included the strong pressures to conformity,

the individual isolation and loneliness.

The frequent ego-

frustration (especially in middle years) and resultant
weakened self esteem, the sense of failure in middle and
post -65 years were also cited.

They felt that all age

groups had a strong need for outside (peer) approval and
recognition, paradoxically coupled with deep-seated fear of
too close involvement with others.

Clark and Anderson's

study of the aged in San Francisco was cited, giving their
•
I
conclusions that the values of the society were very hard
on the aged.

They found that American society's stress on

autonomy and achievement left the aged entirely autonomous— ■
alone, isolated, and convinced of their complete failure
since they could no longer achieve.
The most certain, the most cut-and-dried, validation
of the themes of the thesis were therefore embodied at this
point.

However, in an attempt to disclose more factors,

1^6
this study went furthers

it explored those aspects of the

theme traits that are not so clearly in congruence with the
enviable record of the American nation, and its monumental
accomplishments in achieving national and individual wealth,
personal freedom of action and self-determination.
question was:

The

how, considering the defects suggested by

observers and researchers, did this society realize such a
high fraction of the founding political ideals of democracy
and equality of opportunity?
Chapter k considered these more tentative, less validated
or even uncertain appraisals.

The first part of the chapter

re-analyzed the historical reports to see whether there had
been a shift over generations, from the inner-directed
"rugged individualist" to the contemporary organizationabiding man.

Evidence showed that child-raising practices

of the 1 7 0 0 's and l800's, as continued in part by the
Pantexes of the 1950*s» could hdve produced fearful, anxious,
driven, peer-pressured personalities in the early period as
well as the later.

But in the earlier times, these charac

teristics could have been masked by the seeming precocity,
competence, and resistance to overt adult direction and
norms.
Hsu's Chinese comparison, first advanced in Chapter 3i
suggested that the special American weaknesses of high crime
rate, extremely high divorce rate, family and personal dis
organization, could have had their roots in this peculiar
American combination of traits.

The chapter followed Ruth
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Benedict's conclusion that there had been a continual growth
or conversion to a dominant norm of considerable discontinuity,
as between the character of the socialization of the child
to cope with life, and the actual process of coping.
^Several authorities noted the m o d e m American tendency
to shield and protect the child and delay true independence.
This was acknowledged as perhaps not an original trait but
one developed over 200 years of affluence and urbanization.
Therefore, it is possible that this defect has added another
element of stress to the individual; he is suddenly, at
adulthood, pitched fully into the autonomous competitive
battle where his self esteem depends upon success relative
to that of his peers.
Jules Henry was an Iconoclastic anthropologist who
strongly contended, on the basis of his participant observation
researches, that contemporary adolescents were not indepen
dent emotionally or economically.

His findings tended to

validate the findings of this author in that his subjects
felt they were supposed to be, or at least supposed to appear
to be independent, and not indicate need for others.

Possibly,

then, there has been some lessening of work-competence
independence training in child raising.

Perhaps there is

some validity to Henry's contention that the manifestations
of successful achievement had become, as in various critics'
eyes, "an insatiable consumerism" destructive not only of
natural resources but of human values, of sense of purpose
and worth, of collateral feelings for others; hence alienation.
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It is possible that these demoralization effects are masked
by an overt individuality and are worsened by fear of
others.
The middle section of Chapter 4 assessed, from the
hindsight of 20 years, Clyde Kluckhohn's delineation of
five areas of Value Trei.ds and Possible Shifts as related
to autonomy and achievement.

He foresaw no lessening in the

drive for achievement} despite the "Greening of America"
type of observation, this author agrees.

However, Kluckhohn

predicted that the autonomy would yield somewhat through the
workings of group pressure and transform itself into a
"collective individualism", wherein groups of individuals
would voluntarily work for community uplift in terms of
esthetics and community betterment controls.

There is some

realization of this trend in campaigns such as those of the
Sierra Club, particularly in that the Club is pushing for
publicly-approved but government-mandated tax and spending
programs to achieve their ends.
In support of Kluckhohn’s prognosis of greater tolerance
for heterogenity and hence a lessening of the conformity
/
patterns, there are numerous current social developments}
for example, the recent granting of full civil rights to
homosexuals.

However, there is also a tendency for new

orthodoxies in attitudes to become fixed— like the liberal
article of faith that increased government spending will
solve social problems.

There seems to be no lessening in

the main avenue of conformity— -that is, in the imperative

1^9
to succeed along paths approved by peers.

The predicted

trend toward hedonism— immediate self-gratification— has
not occurred to any full extent, since the deferred gratifi
cation pattern is still paramount for the mainstream strivers
as the pattern for success.

One evidence is the tremendous

pressure on students to get into law and medical schools.
Kluckhohn's fourth prognosis, acceptance of government
controls and services, has become by far the overwhelming
social development of the times.

In forty years, 1933 to

1973i the United States has become a semi-socialistic
society under the banner of "’Liberalism, ’’ Yet here again,
the deep-seated twin traits of the culture, autonomy and
achievement, have not been rendered obsolete in this govern
ment-managed and insured society.

Rather, these traits

have been adapted to the enlarged government-overseen and
government-supported arena of achievement.

Although avant

garde educators decry the stress on competition, for every
individual "dropping out" of the competition a dozen or more
new aspirants to higher status shoulder their way into the
race.

In particular, the erstwhile disadvantaged minorities,

racial and sexual, are now actively spurred to seek their
rights and psychic fulfillment in pursuit of higher job
status.

Kluckhohn's predicted equalization of roles for

women and men suddenly appeared to be happening about 1 9 6 8 .
This development tended to intensify the main trend: compe
tition to achieve has become ever more acute with women
now bona fide competitors.
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The latter part of Chapter k enumerated the major

loose ends needing resolution, making an effort to regain
perspective whereby the selected study traits would not
appear out of proportion to other, equally-significant
American traits.

There is a possibility that some of the

creativity of American :ociety comes from individuals
seeking individual expression and relief from the cultural
confines of conformity.

Hsu and Burdick held that a minority

of achievers found individual fulfillment in "offbeat" but
potentially innovative and useful "pioneering."

Such

idiosyncratic pioneering may become more acceptable and
i

win recognition, probably first in the sciences, technology,
and academia, and finally in the main social stream of
society.
The disorganization, degradation, and high percentage
of deaths among the American prisoners in the Korean War
gave rise to misgivings as to whether the traits of the
culture are socially as well as individually constructive.
Though it is possible to relate this behavior to the effects
of the autonomous achievement trait-pattems traced in this

I'

thesis, it is not within:the scope of the thesis to attempt
to resolve the problems of American society and its cultural
paradoxes.
Chapter

then, attempted a reconciliation of the

great achievements'of the American people with the social
and anti-social manifestations of the thematic traits and
their negative reciprocals.

The latter part of the chapter
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discussed our society's inability to fulfill Its national
ideals of universal equality and universal achievement.
Of particular concern was the fact that American acceptance
of public and community responsibility has been slower than
Western Europe's.

This can be traced to historic stress on

individualism, privatism, and the resultant lag in controls
and amenities such as environmental protection, street
policing, or any form of voluntary public self-policing.
The chapter also traced the massive growth of surrogate
OOllaterality--the legally created substitutes for original
family and community ties and supports, those great insti
tutions, the businesses and corporations and the continuallyswelling government bureaucracy,

That "rugged individual",

the normative American, shows a willingness and indeed
enthusiasm to work in these "surrogate kindreds," under
bosses and in a state of temporary, workaday, enforced
cooperation.

Here he has obviously found a new "El Dorado,"

a means to achieve an individualized livelihood, a channel
for his aspirations to success.
In toto, this American system resulted in enormous
achievements— the settlement of a continent, winning of
several wars, and landing of a rocket on the moon--in
company with great individual standards of affluence and
considerable political freedom.

Possibly, this autonomous

achiever, this American, is able to accomplish so much
groupwise for two reasons: first, because group cooperation
is the main avenue available for achievement in 20th-century
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America, but also because he probably has a latent deepseated need for approval, and even a genetic or historical
cultural-social predisposition to work with others.

Therefore,

under the direction and enforced cooperation of an insti
tutional setting, he works well and achieves, though with
some productive loss and lack of allegiance and sense of
belonging due to the omnipresent intense competitive rivalries
and insecurities.

However, if at any time the institutional

framework is removed, serious difficulties arise within the
individual; Korean War prisoners and the aged in American
society are divergent but clear examples.

Within the system

l

also are the probably-widespread hidden "failures" and
"mediocrities," the so-called "alienated" from job and
society.
The final conclusion of this thesis is that the
continuing inhumanity, the isolation, the frustration of
the many, the personal devastation of the. aged, might not
be a necessary corollary for future national achievement.'
Revamping the values and social system to provide more
worth-accruing participatory roles, more recognition of
each person, more interaction of people— somewhat along
the lines of the Mormons or of those simple societies as
in the Caucasus where all have a useful and respected role—
would be a desirable avenue for American development.
There would, however, have to be a vast shift in values to
accomplish this.
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